Securing Unity and Reverence: Chinese ontological security across its maritime and frontier disputes by Curtis, Henry
  
 
 
 
 
SECURING UNITY AND REVERENCE:  
CHINESE ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY ACROSS  
ITS MARITIME AND FRONTIER DISPUTES 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
 
HENRY CURTIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis  
submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington 
 in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of International Relations 
 
 
 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 
2015 
 
  
1 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... 3 
I Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 4 
II Theory and Methodology .................................................................................................. 7 
III A Brief History of China’s Territorial Disputes ......................................................... 13 
A Nineteenth Century Territorial History ......................................................................... 13 
B Twentieth Century Territorial History .......................................................................... 16 
C Disputes of the People’s Republic of China: 1949-Present .......................................... 19 
IV Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 29 
V Chinese National Identity in its Territorial Disputes .................................................... 37 
A Chinese National Identity: Exceptionalism, Humiliation and Unity. ........................... 37 
B The 1950s, Chinese Exceptionalism and National Humiliation ................................... 40 
C The late 1950s, the 1960s, and the Domestic Mobilisation of Unified China. ............. 43 
1 The Burmese Settlement ........................................................................................... 44 
2 India, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama: Concession and Conflict ..................................... 47 
D The 1970s: The Central Kingdom in the South China Sea ........................................... 50 
E The 1980s and 1990s: The Reform Age and the turn in Chinese Exceptionalism ....... 52 
1 The Sino-Indian Dispute and Defining the Chinese Nation ...................................... 53 
2 Cooperation without Settlement in the South China Sea .......................................... 56 
F Continuing and Predicted Trends in Chinese Territory Disputes ................................. 58 
VI Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 60 
VII  Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 63 
 
  
2 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This thesis draws on the Constructivist school of International Relations, applying the theory 
of ontological security to explain diverging patterns of behaviour by China across its 
maritime and frontier territorial disputes. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China, these patterns have seen China consistently interact with states adjacent to its frontiers 
to settle disputes peacefully, with occasional instances of conflict. Conversely, in its maritime 
disputes, though varying in its levels of aggression and cooperation, China has resolutely 
refused to settle with disputant states. In examining these varying behaviours, it is argued that 
differences derive from the differing ability of China to secure its national identity between 
the two types of dispute. Analysing the examples of the Sino-Indian dispute and border war, 
the Burmese border agreement, and the ongoing South China Sea disputes, periods of conflict 
and settlement in these disputes are compared to changing manifestations of Chinese national 
identity. What results is an illustration of frontier border settlement contributing to the 
security of China’s identity as a unified, pluralistic nation state. The absence of national 
minority populations in relation to maritime disputes alternatively sees continued interaction 
in these disputes as securing China’s identity as the superior ‘Central Kingdom’ relative to 
peripheral South East Asian states, while offering little incentive for settlement. Both types of 
dispute can be viewed as contributing to the biographical narrative of China’s ‘Century of 
Humiliation’. This thesis presents a significant departure from existing studies of China’s 
disputes, predominantly undertaken from a Realist perspective. Additionally, it expands on 
existing Constructivist literature by demonstrating how national identity can result in a range 
of behaviours across a range of differing disputes, further validating the emerging ontological 
security approach within International Relations scholarship. 
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I Introduction 
Since its establishment in 1949 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has maintained or 
settled territory disputes across most of its borders. On its frontier, that is the borders shared 
with its continental neighbours, settlement of disputes has been widespread, though not total. 
Disputes remain with India, and settlement when it has occurred has been undertaken largely 
in two distinct periods of time, the early 1960s and the 1990s. Conversely, China has 
maintained a number of offshore maritime disputes which have shown little likelihood of 
settlement. Both types of dispute have at times resulted in conflict. A number of questions 
can be asked of China’s disputes. Why, given the preponderance of settlement in frontier 
disputes have maritime disputes been left almost exclusively unsettled? Why too, have some 
frontier disputes gone unsettled despite the willingness of China to settle others? And how 
can we explain the turns to conflict where these have occurred?  
 
The purpose of this research has been to undertake a comparative study of Chinese territorial 
disputes between China and neighbouring states across both land and maritime borders, with 
the aim of providing answers to the questions asked above. This research is significant in that 
it deviates from the usual theoretical approach of International Relations scholars regarding 
this topic, by approaching the study from a constructivist perspective. To this end, variables 
in the disputes as they relate to China’s changing national identity have comprised the sum of 
the analysis. While there is a great deal of scholarship which focuses on certain specific 
disputes China has maintained with its neighbours, much of this analysis is undertaken from a 
realist perspective. Furthermore, while it is commonplace for scholars to examine China’s 
disputes individually, or to systematically study China’s disputes with its continental 
neighbours, comparisons of China’s inland and offshore disputes constitute a significantly 
under-researched area of international relations.  
 
This thesis argues that China’s behaviour in its territory disputes should be viewed as a 
process of pursuing ontological security, in which actions are taken to reduce threats to, or to 
enhance, China’s self-identity. In examining the varying behaviours noted above, it is argued 
that differences derive from the differing ability of China to secure its national identity 
between the two types of dispute. The Chinese ontologies which are examined in this paper 
are those of Chinese exceptionalism, the Century of Humiliation, and the unified Chinese 
nation. While these ontologies are interrelated, and indeed allusions to the first two can be 
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viewed in all of China’s disputes, the securing of China’s identity as a unified but pluralistic 
nation state is only achievable through its frontier disputes, in which national minorities are 
present along or near disputed borders. Thus, settlement has been common in frontier 
disputes in periods when the domestic strengthening of the unified nation of China was 
viewed as important to the state’s goals, and conflict has occurred where this identity has 
come under threat. Alternatively, it is argued that Chinese behaviour in maritime disputes has 
served to strengthen China’s identity relative to other disputant states, and serves to secure 
China’s identification as the centre of the Asian world. This identity has at times been 
secured through the pursuit of deference from disputant states, or through China acting as the 
moralistic leader of those states.    
 
This thesis is not exhaustive on the topic of China’s many territory disputes. Instead, case 
studies have been selected in order to illustrate the author’s argument. The inland disputes of 
China’s borders with India and Burma will be assessed, with analysis of China’s ontological 
relationship with the associated borderland people being the focus of the argument. These 
two disputes reveal varying aspects of China’s approach to territory disputes. Both of these 
disputes arose from similar imperial legacies in the nineteenth century, and at times their 
origins overlap. However, while the Burmese dispute was settled successfully and early in the 
PRC’s history, the Indian dispute remains unresolved. In the case of China’s maritime 
disputes, China’s relations with the South East Asian states bordering the South China Sea 
are explored. The variance in China’s actions in the South China Sea is argued to be 
understood as pertaining to the changing salience of China’s perception of its self in relation 
to its fellow disputants in this region.    
 
The contents of this thesis can be broken down as follows. The following chapter presents the 
methodology for the research undertaken. This chapter outlines the key tenants of the 
constructivist approach and the associated theories of ontological security, their application 
within the paper, and the benefits of this approach to the analysis of state borders more 
broadly. Chapter III provides a brief history of the disputes in question. These histories are 
presented in three parts, respectively detailing the nineteenth century Qing administration of 
the peripheral regions and the impact of European imperialism; the early twentieth century 
history of the disputes, initially under the failing Empire and subsequently under the 
Nationalist Government of China; and finally, the actions of the PRC, including settlements 
and ongoing negotiations up to the present day. Chapter IV provides a literature review for 
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the topic, noting the existing scholarship and its shortcomings. Of note is the lack of studies 
which provide a concurrent analysis of China’s maritime and land-based territory disputes. 
The strengths and weaknesses of, in particular, realist examinations of the disputes, and 
papers which touch on constructivist elements of the various disputes are also noted here. 
Finally, Chapter V outlines the main argument of this paper. This chapter provides an 
overview of the iterations of Chinese national identity relative to this discussion. Following 
this, the changing nature of Chinese identity in broader Chinese relations is discussed, 
identifying changes which align with periods of significance in China’s territorial disputes.  
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II Theory and Methodology 
This thesis draws on the constructivist school of International Relations theory, and 
accordingly, starts from the basis that China’s interests, and consequently its actions in 
territorial disputes are based on the social identification China has of itself and of those it is 
engaged in disputes with. In short, ‘interests [are treated] as endogenous to such interaction’ 
as that between China and its neighbour states, and that this occurs ‘as a consequence of 
identity acquisition, as learned through processes of communication, reflection on 
experience, and role enactment’ (Reus-Smit, 2009, p. 223). Constructivism moves analysis of 
interstate relations away from the systemic, rationalist, and materialist issues of economic 
interdependence and the balance of power found in neo-liberalism and neo-realism, instead 
choosing to focus on normative and ideational aspects of those relations. Constructivist 
approaches to Asian interstate relations are limited in respect to Chinese foreign policy, 
where variables relating to realist and neo-realist theoretical approaches in particular are 
widely held to be the most relevant. The dominance of realist approaches in Asian studies 
occurs at the expense of liberalist ideas also. Neo-liberal and liberal theoretical approaches 
would assume that economic interdependence and international institutions would have a 
favourable effect on the settlement of territorial disputes (Burchill, 2009). However, existing 
scholarship widely regards Asia as lacking evidence supporting the viability of neo-liberal 
variables in the region (Goldsmith, 2007).  
 
Realism, based on assumptions of state self-interest within an anarchic environment 
(Donnelly, 2009, p. 32), is widespread in analysis in relation to China. Writings such as those 
of Mearsheimer (2006), generally foresee an un-peaceful, aggressive and expanding state 
with growing power in China. The simplistic assumptions about territorial disputes which 
draw down from this school of thought are stark, and as noted above, largely incorrect given 
China’s propensity to settle its disputes. Similarly, Waltzian neo-realism with its emphasis on 
the polarity of the international system - where states are compelled to align themselves based 
on their power relative to others (Donnelly, 2009, p. 36) - is a commonly used explanation for 
Chinese behaviour. Whether variables outside of the scope of liberalism and realism can 
account for China’s decisions to settle some territorial disputes, while refusing to settle other 
(mostly maritime) disputes, is central to the questions asked by this thesis. 
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Nevertheless, constructivism does not aim to dismiss the importance of these aforementioned 
theories in their entirety. Rather, this thesis aims to illustrate that the material aspects of 
interstate relations understood through the alternate major theories of International Relations 
can only occur within the context of social constructs. As Wendt puts it, ‘materialists cannot 
claim power and interest as “their” variables; it all depends on how the latter are constituted’ 
(as cited in Kratochiwil, 2006, p. 25). This constitution sees states act towards others based 
on the meaning they hold for that state, both in terms of their own self-identification and their 
understanding of the Other. Such understanding is developed through an ongoing process of 
participation in the international system which is informed by, and contributes to, state 
identities. For the constructivist, behaviours between states become predictable when a social 
act comes to create expectations of future behaviour through the repetition of signalling, 
interpreting, and responding towards others (Wendt, 1992, p. 405). Naturally then, the 
historical identification and interaction of states is central to understanding contemporary 
actions and expectations.  
 
At times, states will engage in ‘character planning’, which may see their identity change 
(Wendt, 1992, p. 419), in turn changing their expectations, interests, and ultimately their 
actions and the actions of other states towards them. This idea is developed more fully in the 
process of ontological security seeking, which has been outlined by Mitzen (2006), and 
Steele (2008). In seeking to maintain ontological security, the security of the state’s identity 
itself becomes its primary interest, rather than its physical security, which is more commonly 
emphasised in International Relations theory. For Mitzen (2006), this theory holds that states 
will act to secure their identities through the process of routinizing their interactions with 
external states (the Other). This provides states with a sense of agency, whereby decisions are 
able to be made based on a degree of certainty of the subsequent outcomes. Expectations for 
interaction are established through the established behavioural routine, which in turn informs 
how a state perceives itself in relation to the Other. In times of ontological security, these 
routines will remain consistent. However, behaviour from the Other which threatens the 
routine may result in ontological insecurity, causing the state to act to realign the interaction 
with its perceived sense of Self.  
 
For Mitzen, identities are created and sustained through interaction with Others, whereas 
Steele expands on this, further suggesting that a state’s identity is developed through its 
‘biographical narrative’. This biographical narrative is inherently bound to the state’s 
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historical narrative of the Self. This narrative comprises the ‘sum of those forms of recall 
whereby the agent reflexively characterises “what” is the origin of his or her actions’ (Steele, 
2008, p. 55), and acts to provide ‘the locus through which agents “work out” their 
understanding of social settings and the placement of their Selves in those settings’ (Steele, 
2008, p. 71). For Steele, ontological insecurity can thus occur through internal changes to 
national identity, stemming from ‘transformative possibilities [arising] not just between the 
Self and the Other, but within the internal dialectic that arises from the ontological security 
seeking process’ (Steele, 2008, p. 32). In other words, a state will become ontologically 
insecure where its actions do not align with internal changes to its identity, causing it to 
change its interactions with others.  
 
The application of the constructivist approach and ontological security to Chinese territorial 
disputes - and indeed territorial disputes in general - is, in fact, well suited given the nature of 
the social construction of state borders. It is clear from Wendt’s seminal article on 
constructivism in International Relations, that the acceptance of ‘territorial property rights’ 
exists only in the context of mutual recognition of those territories (Wendt, 1992, p. 70). The 
point here is that state borders are an inherently ideational concept, developed through 
interactions with others. As such the analytical focus of constructivism is not only pertinent 
to national borders when they are being contested or are the subject of hostility either by 
governments or citizens, but at all times during their existence. Beyond physical boundaries, 
borders are ‘signs of the eminent domain of that state [emphasis added], and are markers of 
the secure relations it has with its neighbours, or are reminders of the hostility that exists 
between states’ (Wilson & Donnan, 1998, p. 9). Likewise, if applied to territorial disputes, 
the process of ontological security can be seen to act in a number of ways, including through 
the maintenance or escalation of a dispute, as well as through its settlement. A change in the 
status quo of such a dispute (regardless of its status at that time) represents a change in the 
routine of the affected states, and therefore should be seen to arise from, or give rise to, a 
period of ontological insecurity. A state will therefore maintain this status quo unless its 
identity is threatened externally, or changes internally, causing its behaviour to change in 
order to regain ontological security.  Dependent on the identity and the associated threat, this 
could occur through either settlement and cooperation, or aggression and conflict. 
 
The importance of concepts of identity becomes especially obvious when applied specifically 
to the territorial disputes of China. A student of China’s territorial disputes will not have to 
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look far to discover the widely accepted importance of the historical borders of the Qing 
dynasty to the disputes of the People’s Republic. In general, however, (as discussed in 
Chapter IV), the structural approaches to China’s territorial dispute which prevail in existing 
scholarship recognise implicitly the existence of the historical social context to these 
disputes, while failing to give such context adequate attention in their analysis. Generally 
speaking, they therefore view borders as fixed variables rather than constructs which require 
contextual analysis in their own right. Such analysis is, at best, incomplete.  
 
Instead, this thesis argues that this historical narrative can be identified in periods when the 
ontology regarding China’s sovereignty over national minorities has taken on heightened 
ontological importance internally. External recognition of this sovereignty, by formally 
defining its limits through dispute settlement, which therefore reaffirms the existence of those 
inside these limits as part of the Chinese nation, acts to secure this ontology. Equally, 
maritime disputes are not settled as settlement would preclude China’s historical 
identification in its position relative to disputant states, causing ontological insecurity. Where 
these states have threatened this routine, China has acted aggressively to maintain its 
ontological security, and has acted cooperatively due to internal changes to its Self-
identification. China’s various actions in disputes have therefore all taken place within the 
context of China’s identification of its past and present Self, its neighbours, and the 
interaction between these parts.  
 
From this position, Wendt’s statement that constructivists should question the ‘what’ and the 
‘how possible’, where structural approaches are limited in their ability to explain the ‘why’, 
(as cited in Kratochiwil, 2006), requires application to Chinese territorial disputes. The 
central questions throughout this paper therefore include: what was the nature of the 
prevailing Chinese national identity at the time of the dispute in question? How did this 
identity relate to the territory in question? And how did China perceive itself in relation to the 
disputant state in question? Through examining how these differ and converge between 
various disputes, and how these variables manifest in diverging interests and actions, it is 
hoped that the application of these questions will illustrate why China has maintained a 
largely concessive pattern of behaviour in frontier disputes, contrasted with an 
uncompromising, relatively combative pattern of behaviour in maritime disputes. 
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Having established the theoretical framework in which this paper will address its topic, the 
question of research methodology requires clarification. The approach taken here is that 
which Reus-Smit characterises as ‘holistic constructivism’, in that it seeks to give recourse to 
both the normative and ideational structure of the international system, and the social 
identities at the domestic state level (Reus-Smit, 2009, p. 225). Much of this paper relies on 
existing scholarship on Chinese territory disputes, Chinese national identity, and Chinese 
foreign relations in general, with limited use of primary documents (but their use where 
available nonetheless). Given the small sample size and the ideational variables central to this 
paper, the methodological approach taken to all sources is, by necessity, qualitative and 
interpretive. For those studies involving social identity and norms, where these concepts are 
irreducible to measurable units, interpretation becomes a constant necessity for the scholar 
(Kratochwil, 1988, p. 265). Attention is paid to the historical context as understood by the 
states themselves, not only of the disputes in question, but more broadly to the general 
interactions of the states in question. This analysis is undertaken in order to give meaning to 
the identity of a state through the examination of its ‘biographical narrative’.  
  
Finally, a comprehensive study of Chinese territory disputes is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but an illustration of the importance of identity and norms in frontier or maritime 
disputes can be shown through selected case studies. The comparative nature of this paper 
requires case studies from both maritime and frontier disputes. While China has settled the 
majority of its frontier disputes, it is desirable to analyse both a frontier dispute that was 
settled without conflict, and one which has been ongoing and has involved conflict, in order 
to illustrate fully the process of ontological security. On its frontiers, China has held disputes 
with the Soviet Union (later Russia and various Central Asian states), Vietnam, India, Laos, 
Bhutan, Burma, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Of these, Fravel suggests 
that the disputes with India and the Soviet Union are those in which conflict can be linked to 
the disputes with the most certainty (Fravel, 2008, pp. 63-64). For ease of analysis, the Sino-
Indian dispute has been selected due to the fact that the dispute has existed between China 
and only one other state throughout its duration, while the latter devolved into various 
disputes following the demise of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century. The selection 
of the Burmese dispute from those remaining was ultimately made based on resource 
availability to the author.  
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Maritime disputes include the disputed island groups of the South China Sea, and the 
Senkaku / Diaoyu island dispute with Japan. As the Senkaku dispute is one Chinese dispute 
which has been subject to constructivist analysis, much of which supports the arguments 
contained here (see chapter IV), the opportunity has been taken here to examine the South 
China Sea disputes, in order to extend this theoretical approach more broadly. Given the 
relatively late initiation of the Senkaku dispute by China in 1970 (Fravel, 2008, p. 334), 
analysis of the South China Sea disputes also allows for the most comprehensive analysis of 
the historical manifestations of China’s identity relative to the disputes. Finally, unless 
required, the intention of this paper is not to provide detailed physical descriptions of the 
territories in dispute, but rather to assess the context in which Chinese behaviour has 
occurred. The following chapters provide a brief overview of the history of these disputes, 
before going on to assess the existing scholarship regarding them. 
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III A Brief History of China’s Territorial Disputes 
In September of 1949 the newly established People’s Republic of China expressed its 
intention to study the treaties and agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign 
governments, with the intention to ‘recognise, abrogate, revise or renegotiate them’ 
(Ginsburgs & Pinkele, 1978, p. 1). Subsequent statements have made clear that this reference 
extended to all borders perceived as having been lost during the century preceding the 
establishment of the People’s Republic. These losses were said to be the result of ‘unequal 
treaties’ undertaken with a weakened Chinese state by foreign imperial powers (Watson, 
1966, p. 24). The purpose of this chapter is to provide a chronology of China’s border history. 
To fully appreciate the context from which the PRC derived its claims, an understanding of 
the origin of China’s border disputes beginning during the Qing Empire is required. This 
chapter begins with a brief overview of the nature of territorial holdings and their subjection 
to ‘unequal’ treaties during the so-called ‘Century of National Humiliation’ between 1839 
and 1949. Following this, the PRC’s responses to and management of the subject disputes of 
this thesis are explored. 
A Nineteenth Century Territorial History 
In his analysis of the origins of China’s disputes, Lamb has expressed the view that the 
colonial powers of Britain, France and Russia, in changing the nature of external threats to 
China during the nineteenth century, made the modern Chinese state (Lamb, 1968, p. 69). 
This suggestion is not made with reference to treaties or border delimitation, but alludes 
instead to the nature of the periphery of China. This periphery - the outer frontiers of China - 
comprised Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Manchuria, and was governed by central China 
through a complex tributary system. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, these frontiers 
lacked formalisation into China proper, instead existing as protectorates with varying levels 
of autonomy. Within this system, China would receive tribute from visiting missions from the 
tributary regions, and these regions would in turn acknowledge dependency and the influence 
of China in their affairs. The significance of these outer borders to the Chinese state was 
dependent on the security of the central Chinese state against invasion from central Asian 
nomadic peoples. China’s involvement in the governance of these frontier regions occurred 
only indirectly (Lamb, 1968, p. 32). An illustration of the importance of these frontier regions 
is found in the divergence between China’s governance of the regions’ outer boundaries (with 
foreign states), and the inner boundaries (those shared with China). Regarding the former, 
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these were at times subject to change through agreement without involvement from the 
Chinese. Conversely, China carefully involved itself in the management of the latter (Lamb, 
1968, p. 28). 
 
The nature of the periphery in pre-twentieth century China can be found in the depiction of 
these areas in Chinese maps. While the outer regions of China had been mapped during the 
Qing dynasty during the seventeenth century during periods of imperial expansion, within 
these maps ‘“China” and the “Qing Empire” were not coterminous…“China” was presented 
as one distinct part of the Qing Empire, and the Manchu homelands [and later other periphery 
regions] another’ (Elman, 2007, p. 49). These maps would later form the basis for some of 
China’s territorial claims, yet at the beginning of the Opium Wars these regions were not 
understood to exist as a part of China in the same way that they would later be pursued in 
twentieth century territory claims (Lamb, 1968, p. 27). The extent of Chinese control over 
these areas varied leading up to the twentieth century. While the ‘centre’ of the Chinese 
Empire maintained an image of a unifying central culture in relation to populations and areas 
over which China maintained great interest and influence, such unity was unstable at best, 
varying in its success throughout nineteenth century Chinese history (Woodside, 2007). They 
were, however, a vital part of the Chinese Empire, and a significant and central part of 
Chinese identity. 
 
By contrast, Chinese interest in its sea-borders waned during the Qing Empire. From the 
seventeenth to the eighteenth century, China focused predominantly on its land frontiers, 
including maintaining attention on an expanding Russia. Chinese intellectual thought 
(including its cartography) and its military would ‘turn inwards’ away from the maritime 
world, leaving the Empire with only a small coastal navy at the start of the Century of 
National Humiliation (Elman, 2007, p. 40). Evidence dating back to the 15th century - 
particularly regarding fishing activities and naval patrols undertaken - is sometimes cited by 
the Chinese with regard to the South China Sea (Zhao, 2013). Such claims need to be 
regarded within the context of twentieth century territory claims and the international norms 
which legitimise these; it could hardly be said that these go as far as to suggest that the South 
China Sea was considered Chinese territory at any time prior to the twentieth century. While 
some Chinese ventured to sea for various reasons, as would come to be espoused within 
contemporary Chinese maritime claims, they ‘were not the spearhead of Chinese territorial 
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advance…and there is no evidence to suggest that Chinese officialdom ever considered them 
as such’ (Lamb, 1968, p. 38).  
 
Aside from the maritime regions, the border disputes which are the subject of this thesis 
continued to develop throughout the nineteenth century, though not in any formal way. Most 
significantly, the Chinese border with both India and Burma developed out of interactions 
between the British Raj, and was subsequently consolidated by Nationalist China and post-
colonial India. The British did recognise Tibet as ‘Chinese Tibet’, in recognition of the 
protectorate status and influence of China over the region. Yet no border was delimited or 
demarcated at the time the British Empire expanded to the areas in question. Where attempts 
were made to establish formal boundaries, these were far from complete (Hyer, 1990, p. 115). 
Indeed, prior to the late nineteenth century the British did not actively pursue the 
establishment of borders. Rather, British interest in the establishment of borders coincided 
with threats to British economic interests, although this was to change in the early twentieth 
century.  
 
The British maintained an awareness of the frontier regions between Tibet and India, areas 
which were largely tribal. However, a strict non-intervention policy was adhered to. The 
frontier of Tibet and Assam is illustrative here. The British adhered to the so-called ‘outer 
line’ of the frontier, within which various tribal peoples such as the tribes of the Tawang 
Tract were observed and understood to come under the sovereignty of Tibet. This outer line 
was south of the eventual contested border of the British established McMahon Line. When 
the British first began to move north from the outer line, it was at least in part an effort to 
wrest influence over these tribal people in the protection of economic interests in Assam 
(Lamb, 1964, pp. 133-139).  
 
Unlike Tibet, where Chinese control varied throughout the nineteenth century, the influence 
of the Chinese Empire on the Burmese state had ceased in significance long before the 
introduction of British rule there. Following a failed military campaign into Burma by the 
Qing in 1790, Chinese conceptions of suzerainty were maintained as the Burmese rulers 
continued to pay tribute to Beijing (Hyer, 1990, p. 143). But Chinese claims to suzerainty 
over Burma proper which may have existed in the nineteenth century were interrupted by the 
British following their annexation of the state, ending with Upper Burma in 1886. Thus, the 
nature of the Sino-Burmese relationship was changed, and the introduction of boundaries was 
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established, by the British. British rule would remain in place in Burma with the state first 
separated from India in 1937 and finally made independent from Britain in 1948 (Lamb, 
1968, p. 147). In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the British began the process of 
establishing boundaries between China and Burma, with the two parties entering into 
agreement in 1894 and an additional supplementary agreement in 1897 which together 
largely delimited much of the border between China and British Burma. 
 
In the process of expanding and consolidating their empire, the Qing asserted themselves 
heavily over the people of the Yunnan frontier, adjacent to the Burmese state. Yet despite 
this, their control over the local populations was never absolute, and was shared and 
negotiated with local authorities who would at times enter tributary relationships with both 
the Qing and the Burmese (Giersch, 1998, p. 15). Later in the twentieth century, at the time of 
the Burmese dispute settlement, this relationship would be characterised by the United States 
Department of State as being separated by a boundary which has been (Department of State, 
1964):  
 
Occupied by peoples of alien cultures. During most of their history, the Burmese and 
Chinese people were content to maintain these regions as buffers between states. 
National policy was based on non-interference in the affairs of tribal peoples while 
exercising only nominal suzerainty. (p. 4) 
 
Alternatively, Chinese writers in the twentieth century became well versed in the 
legitimisation of Chinese dominance of local minorities through the portrayal of the frontier 
area as one steeped in central Chinese control, an ‘inseparable part of the great ancestral 
land’s domain’ (Giersch, 1998, p. 13). The significance of this ambiguous Chinese influence, 
and its relationship with China’s understanding of the area as internal to the Chinese state, 
will be explored more fully later in this paper. 
B Twentieth Century Territorial History 
While Chinese allusions to the ‘Century of National Humiliation’ suggest a long period of 
exploitation, it was during the early twentieth century that points of reference for competing 
claims in the Indian and Burmese borders were created. In 1905, following the agreements of 
the late nineteenth century, the Sino-Burmese boundary was subject to a joint survey and a 
convention on the matter was signed by the two states in the following year, during which the 
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British acknowledged Tibet as being included within Chinese territory (Maung, 1961, p. 39). 
In 1910, as Chinese influence on the frontiers weakened, Chinese troops occupied Tibet as 
the Qing sought to incorporate Tibet into the Chinese provincial system. During this time 
Chinese efforts to subjugate Mishmi tribal people caused British suspicion to focus on 
Chinese interests in the Himalayan Assam area in the eastern sector of the frontier with India 
(Lamb, 1964, pp. 127-142). Tibetan independence was declared internally in 1912 when the 
collapse of the Chinese Empire was followed by the subsequent withdrawal of Chinese forces 
from Tibet (Watson, 1966, p. 55). As British fears of Chinese involvement in the area had 
been alleviated, the British moved to consolidate their interests in the area by establishing 
Tibet as a buffer state in 1913, and initiated the Simla Conference on the pretext of 
confirming the nature of Chinese involvement in Tibet. 
 
The Simla Conference of 1914 was a crucial point in the history of the Sino-Indian border 
dispute. Ultimately, the Chinese could not agree on the establishment of a Chinese inner and 
independent outer Tibet, which was the intent of the conference. Consequently, initial 
Chinese acceptance of the Simla agreement was later repudiated by the Chinese Government 
in objection to the borders suggested between the inner and outer zones. Despite Chinese 
rejections of the conference talks, borders between Indian Assam and Tibet were 
subsequently devised at the conference by Sir Henry McMahon, the British delegate who 
would ultimately lend his name to the boundary. These boundaries were agreed to by the 
Tibetans, but without Chinese involvement (Lamb, 1964, pp. 143-147). The boundaries 
agreed by the British and Tibetans would not be published until the 1930s, and their existence 
was never included in any Chinese maps. Nevertheless, the McMahon Line significantly 
increased Indian territory as recognised by the British, beyond the previously adhered to 
‘outer line’. Parts of the McMahon Line also extended into the Sino-Burmese border in the 
east, and would be subject to renegotiation under the PRC later in the century. The McMahon 
Line would be inherited by independent India from the British and would remain the basis for 
much of the Indian claim in the eventual dispute with the PRC. 
 
At this time the current Chinese claim to the South China Sea began to be represented on 
Chinese maps through the so-called ‘nine-dash line’, dating to around 1914. While initial 
claims to this area were limited to two of the four island groups in the South China Sea, the 
scope of Chinese claims would later extend as interest in the area increased (Gao & Jia, 2013, 
p. 100). In the South China Sea, the full extent of Chinese claims had been determined prior 
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to the establishment of the People’s Republic with the nine-dash line, including all features 
within the Sea included in official government maps from 1947 (Zhao, 2013, p. 29). The 
Chinese claim to this area is, therefore, noted to contain the entirety of the South China Sea, 
the islands therein and the adjacent waters. 
 
The question of the Sino-Burmese border was revisited between 1935-1937 under the auspice 
of the League of Nations, during which time a committee was established to determine the 
delimitation of the Wa state region in the southern sector of the border. The work of this 
committee was eventually signed in 1941 in an Anglo-Sino agreement, but demarcation of 
the agreed boundary was never completed (Department of State, 1964, p. 5). The agreement 
was undertaken to clarify the border previously established unilaterally by the British and 
sought to clarify rights regarding Chinese and British mining interests in the Wa state region. 
The Nationalist Chinese government, having signed the 1941 agreement, would go on to 
challenge it and call for renegotiations in the post war years (Lamb, 1964, p. 157). The 1941 
agreement would later be held by the PRC as an example of the exploitation of a weak 
Chinese government by imperial powers, and deemed an unfair and illegitimate agreement. 
 
Following World War Two, decolonisation and the subsequent successors of imperialism 
began to influence interstate competition in the island groups of the South China Sea. The 
withdrawal of imperial powers from the area either transferred territory to newly independent 
states, or left territory without clear ownership. This would consequently sow the seed for 
multilateral territorial disputes in the South China Seas, as Japan gave up all rights to the area 
through the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. The treaty saw Japan renounce sovereignty 
to their Spratly and Parcel Island holdings, with no clear indication given as to whom 
ownership of these islands would be transferred (Hara, 2012). France had maintained a 
presence on both the Spratly Islands and the Parcel Islands during the height of its South East 
Asian colonisation. While not coerced into its losses, the cost of World War Two and the 
difficulty of maintaining colonies in the post-war years saw France reduce its occupation to 
only the Spratly Islands. As interest in the territories in the South China Sea grew in the 
twentieth century, the lack of clarity in ownership, the hangovers of both Asian and European 
imperialism, and the potential for, and legitimacy of, economic exploitation would feed into 
the divergent maritime claims of South East Asian states. 
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By the advent of the PRC in 1949, the foundation of China’s territory disputes had been laid, 
but was far from being formally expressed. The extent of territory in question at the boundary 
shared between Tibet and India included the regions of Aksai Chin at the western sector of 
the border, and the Assam/Tibet border in the eastern sector. Within this claim, 
approximately fifty thousand square miles of disputed territory existed to be claimed by the 
Chinese (Lamb, 1964, p. 9). The Chinese claim to territory in Burma equated to roughly ten 
thousand square miles, and could also be divided into several sections; in the northern sector 
of the border the Kachin region, the Nanwan Tract in the middle section of the border, and 
the disputed areas in the Wa state region (Hyer, 1990, pp. 151-153). In the South China Sea, 
China’s claim remained that which was represented in the nine-dash line.   
C Disputes of the People’s Republic of China: 1949-Present  
While the newly established Communist government of China had made clear their intentions 
regarding China’s borders in 1949, the 1950s saw a slow approach to undertaking formal 
talks regarding those borders, and settlement of the disputed borders was not a high priority 
for the Chinese. However, for the PRC, the 1950s was an important decade in the 
borderlands, and particularly in Tibet. While formal delimited and demarcated borders may 
not have been devised during the 1950s, the border disputes must be understood within the 
context of broader events during that decade. In 1950 the PRC began the re-incorporation of 
the Tibetan state into the China, defeating ethnic Tibetan forces in the eastern Tibetan region, 
leading to agreement from Lhasa on the incorporation of Tibet into the PRC. The 1950s in 
Tibet were characterised by this ongoing incorporation, upheld in the ‘17 Point Agreement’ 
under which Tibet retained its political systems and the authority of the Dalai Lama remained 
in place, but China took control of Tibet’s foreign relations. Rule in Tibet therefore remained 
indirect, and attempts at assimilation of Tibetan nationals into China were ultimately far from 
successful (Fravel, 2008, pp. 73-75). Ethnic uprisings against the Chinese government would 
first occur following changes by the Chinese to the Tibetan political system in the mid-1950s, 
taking place in rural Tibet and abutting regions including Yunnan and Xinjiang. In 1958 these 
revolts spread to Lhasa, culminating in the Tibetan crisis of 1959. The forces of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) forcefully suppressed Tibetan rebels; Tibet’s political system was 
removed and replaced with Chinese governance through the prefecture system; and the Dalai 
Lama fled the region, taking refuge in India (Fravel, 2008, pp. 75-79). 
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The Tibetan border with India had its initial appearance in Chinese foreign policy following 
the 1950 ‘liberation’ of Tibet by the PRC, and acted indirectly as the catalyst for Sino-Indian 
discussion on the border dispute. On regaining authority over the formally independent Tibet 
(independence considered invalid by the Chinese), the PRC renounced those treaties entered 
into or maintained by Tibet with its Indian neighbours. Recognising that they would need to 
accept Chinese authority in Tibet, India met with China in 1954, the result of which was an 
agreement between the two states which allowed for India’s continued economic and cultural 
ties to Tibet, and Indian recognition of China’s sovereignty over Tibet (Hyer, 1990, p. 119). 
The nature of the Tibetan border was raised only indirectly at the 1954 negotiations, arising 
in discussions relating to trading routes across the border, but no meaningful discussions were 
undertaken as to the location of that border, or even to the recognition that the border was in 
dispute.  
 
The 1954 agreement represented the beginning of a brief cordial period in Sino-Indian 
relations. Only months after the agreement was signed, the well-known ‘Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence’ was adopted for the relationship between the two states. These 
principles, which would shortly thereafter enter into China’s foreign policy in Asia more 
broadly, consisted of mutual respect for other’s territorial sovereignty; mutual non-
aggression; non-interference in another state’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; 
and peaceful coexistence (Ogden, 2013, p. 260; Watson, 1966, p. 83). Yet for the majority of 
the 1950s these principles were insufficient to allow for progress in the dispute, which instead 
went unmentioned. However, the publication of Chinese maps which included Indian or 
Burmese territory (or the territory of other states) represented as Chinese would at times draw 
protests from India, who continued to recognise the validity of the McMahon line. From 
China, these protests would elicit a response which would invariably note that the maps 
should not be viewed as official Chinese claims, and that China had not yet reviewed the 
background of the borders and so was not yet prepared to comment on them (Watson, 1966, 
p. 81). Clarity on China’s claims on the border would not be realised until 1959.  
 
A primary point of tension with India arose through the building of a Chinese road through 
the Aksai Chin region in the western sector of the border, connecting the autonomous 
Chinese border regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. The region had been used by the Chinese to 
facilitate their reoccupation of Tibet in the early 1950s, and the road had been subsequently 
built between 1956 and 1957. The road, being the only connection between the two Chinese 
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regions, was seen as one of significant strategic importance to the Chinese. However, its 
appearance in an area which had never been formally delimited, and was considered by the 
Indian government to be Indian Territory despite Chinese control of the area, alerted India to 
Chinese claims to the region (Hyer, 1990, pp. 125-126). For India, the dispute they had 
understood to be confined to the legitimacy of the McMahon line was expanded. Tensions 
also arose from Chinese activities beyond what was considered Indian Territory in the eastern 
sector, leading to a minor confrontation along the border in 1959. Similarly, during the 1950s, 
the PLA would occasionally venture across into territory claimed by the Burmese, in pursuit 
of Nationalist Chinese militants, much to the protest of the Burmese (Watson, 1966, p. 80).   
 
While border talks were not a high priority for China along its frontiers, increasing interest in 
the South China Sea territories from other states forced China to take notice of its maritime 
claims. In 1956 the first clash over the area since the Second World War would occur 
following Filipino involvement in the area. Two Filipino citizens acted to claim fifty three 
features of the Spratly island group, including Itu Abu, the largest feature, only to ultimately 
be expelled by a Taiwanese naval flotilla (Raine & Le Miere, 2013, p. 40). Prior to their 
expulsion, China aggressively restated their claim to the entirety of the South China Sea. But 
it was only once faced with such competition from neighbouring states that these claims were 
restated by China. This competition was exacerbated following France’s withdrawal from the 
region in the same year and the subsequent inheritance of French holdings in the Paracel 
islands by South Vietnam. It is notable that the PRC did not maintain an open dispute with 
imperial France. Instead, their reassertion of ownership was undertaken in the context of 
competition with newly independent Asian states.  
 
From late 1959 until the mid-1960s, China would enter into a period of widespread 
settlement along its continental borders, settling disputes with Burma, Nepal, North Korea, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (Fravel, 2008, p. 45). It was in 1960 that the Chinese 
also offered a ‘package deal’ to India. The deal consisted of Chinese recognition of the border 
represented by the McMahon line (though not the validity of the Simla agreement) in the 
middle and eastern sectors of the Indian border, in exchange for concessions from India in the 
recognition of the entire Aksai Chin areas as Chinese. Nevertheless, the deal was rejected by 
India, which was resolutely opposed to conceding territory to the Chinese (Hyer, 1990, pp. 
133-135). Conversely, the Burmese settlement, first signed on 23 January 1960 following 
only five days of negotiations, was held as the shining light of Chinese territorial negotiation 
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(Watson, 1966, p. 127). The Burmese settlement was the first to be formally undertaken by 
the People’s Republic, having occurred at the request of the Burmese. The settlement 
occurred following a period from 1953 in which the forces of the PLA were stationed along 
the Burmese border following the withdrawal of Nationalist forces into the Burmese state. 
The presence of these forces is noted by some scholars as a factor in Burma’s cooperation 
(Lamb, 1968, p. 151; Watson, 1966, pp. 89-94), yet the Burmese emphasised that cooperation 
had occurred under the free will of both states. For their part, the Chinese proclaimed the 
settlement a demonstration of friendly Burmese-Sino relations, and a ‘brilliant example’ of 
peaceful coexistence which other disputant nations and China should aspire to recreate 
(Maung, 1961, p. 38). 
 
Notably, the Burmese settlement resulted largely in recognition of the status quo, including a 
small section of the McMahon line on the Burmese border. The recognition of these borders 
by the Chinese government occurred despite two key points; the first being the use of maps 
by the CCP which recognised large parts of northern Burma as Chinese. The second was 
Burma’s acknowledgement of the boundary as being ‘inherited from history, a product of 
imperial politics of aggression’, and therefore the subsequent need for their renegotiation; a 
statement in line with Chinese claims that the border was void having been founded in an 
unjust treaty (Maung, 1961, pp. 38-40). Ultimately the Chinese claim was reduced 
significantly to facilitate settlement, with concessions against their original claim of some ten 
thousand square miles ending in only fifty square miles of additional Chinese territory. It is 
clear then that the Chinese goal in this settlement was not large amounts of territory, nor the 
exploitation of this territory, given that Chinese rights to ‘participation in mining enterprises’ 
were renounced (Department of State, 1964, p. 9). Neither, evidently, was the goal to reclaim 
territorial boundaries which were viewed as previously part of the Chinese Empire.  
 
The terms of the agreement were largely based on sovereignty over border peoples. The 
villages of Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang, and the tribal areas of Panhung and Panlao were 
turned over to the Chinese, as were the Yawng Hok and Lungnai villages (Department of 
State, 1964, p. 7). The two latter villages were provided to the Chinese as a point of 
administrative clarification in the Wa state region of the border. The 1941 line established 
between the British and the Nationalist Government had dissected several villages, of which 
two were clarified as Chinese, and four recognised as residing within Burma (Lamb, 1968, p. 
156). Those villages incorporated into China had been claimed by the British early in the 
23 
 
 
 
twentieth century despite Chinese protests, although Chinese rights to these villages were 
recognised in the offer of the British to lease control of them from China (Maung, 1961, p. 
40). Also previously leased by the British, but now ‘gifted’ by the Chinese to Burma, was the 
Nanwan Tract, an area through which a Burmese highway ran. The Tract was exchanged for 
the Chinese claim to the area of the Wa state region.   
 
Despite the example of the Burmese settlement being promoted by the Chinese, the Indian 
dispute proved challenging to outwardly friendly Sino-Indian relations. The Tibetan crisis in 
Lhasa in 1959 had seen these relations breakdown following the amicable period of the 
1950s. The suspicions of Mao that India was in collusion with the United States in an effort 
to undermine Chinese sovereignty in Tibet (Garver J. W., 2004, p. 10), were exacerbated by 
Indian acceptance of thousands of Tibetan refugees, famously including the Dalai Lama. 
Assurances that the Dalai Lama would not undertake political actions against China from 
India were proven groundless (Maxwell, 1970, p. 105). In 1959, Chinese and Indian forces 
exchanged fire along the border, following moves by both sides to establish military posts 
within disputed areas (Maxwell, 1970). Despite these tensions the Chinese nevertheless 
pursued settlement in the dispute, leading them to instigate the unsuccessful negotiations in 
April 1960 in which the ‘package deal’ was offered.  
 
The dispute was intensified by India when the ‘forward policy’ was adopted by Nehru in 
1961, involving the advancement of forces of the Indian Army into disputed Chinese territory 
and the establishment of outposts in an effort to force the Chinese out of these areas. By 
1962, the forward policy had resulted in various small engagements between forces of the 
PLA and the Indian Army. The forward policy was predicated on the assumption by the 
Indian government that the Chinese would not resort to full scale force. Yet increasingly, and 
in light of India’s continued refusal to negotiate on the issue, China would respond to Indian 
expeditions into disputed territory with warnings that military involvement would occur 
should the actions of the Indians not cease (Maxwell, 1999). In 1962, the potential of these 
tensions was realised in a brief but significant border war between India and China.  
 
The Sino-Indian border war occurred following a rise in tensions in the eastern sector of the 
border in October of 1962. While China had been increasing its forces in both the western 
and eastern sectors without resorting to full scale conflict, tensions came to a head in the 
eastern sector along the disputed Thag La ridge (Fravel, 2008, p. 190). The Indian claim in 
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this area extended north of the McMahon Line, following the ridge line instead of the agreed 
coordinates of the Simla agreement, based on what India claimed was McMahon’s original 
intention. Indian confidence in its own strategic advantage in the area, and resolute political 
and public belief that China were advancing on Indian territory, led Nehru to publically 
announce on the 12
th
 of October that Indian forces would undertake offensive actions against 
Chinese forces, focussing on the Thag La ridge boundary (Maxwell, 1970, p. 302). However, 
Indian confidence was severely misplaced, and Nehru’s statement was viewed by Beijing as 
absolute. On the twentieth of October the PLA began a month long offensive against Indian 
forces along the full extent of the Sino-Indian border. Indian ‘forward policy’ posts were 
overwhelmed and Indian military forces experienced heavy loses. The Chinese offensive was 
punctuated by additional offers from the Chinese to negotiate on the boundary question, 
offers which were rejected by the Indian government (Maxwell, 1999, p. 913).  
 
China’s advance into the disputed territory was followed by a proposed ceasefire from the 
Chinese, in which Chinese troops would not only withdraw from disputed territory, but 
would further withdraw twenty kilometres back from the disputed McMahon line (Maxwell, 
1970, p. 417). Ultimately the Chinese withdrew promptly and unilaterally on the 22
nd
 
November 1962, without any demands to retain the territory which they had advanced into, 
an action which came as a surprise to many observers at the time. As summed up by Hyer, 
the Chinese position ‘clearly demonstrated that China was not bent on territorial expansion, 
but sought a boundary settlement and had undertaken the invasion in an attempt to force India 
back to the negotiating table’ (Hyer, 1990, p. 137). This strategy was ultimately far from 
being successful. Instead, following the war of 1962, the Sino-Indian border dispute remained 
intact but went unaddressed for another twenty five years. Far from resuming negotiations, 
Indian anti-Chinese sentiment was consolidated by the border war, and in response India cut 
communications with Beijing until 1967. Nehru’s diplomatic position on the dispute 
remained unchanged in perpetuity, although with varying degrees of zealousness; 
compromise on the boundaries claimed by India was not an option. However, the forward 
policy which had been so significant in the lead up to the 1962 war was removed, the Indian 
army withdrew from the area, and border tensions were largely alleviated (Maxwell, 1999, p. 
914).  
 
Despite knowledge of Chinese claims to the area, in the South China Sea hostility was kept to 
a minimum. During the 1950s, Chinese fishermen operating within the Paracel Island group 
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occasionally came into contact with South Vietnamese vessels, resulting in the removal of the 
fishermen from the area (Fravel, 2008, p. 274), an action characterised by the Chinese as 
kidnapping and abduction. Yet, aside from the claims to the region noted above, activities by 
China regarding its claim remained absent until the 1970s. In the intervening year the 
interests in the South China Sea from various independent states had begun to be intensified 
within the emerging context of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the associated economic rights that entailed (Hara, 2012). This new 
international maritime context saw the occupation of features in the Spratly Island group by 
both South Vietnam and the Filipino Government; an island group claimed by China but of 
which it had no territorial holdings.  
 
Conflict for China in the South China Sea did not occur until January 1974, in the Battle of 
the Paracels, a brief naval conflict against South Vietnam. While the conflict caused loss of 
life on both sides, the South Vietnamese were ultimately unable to maintain their presence 
when an appeal for United States’ support failed. South Vietnam relinquished its territorial 
holdings in the Paracels to China following the conflict, and subsequently all remaining 
South Vietnamese claims were absorbed by the unified state of Vietnam in 1976 following 
the conclusion of the Vietnam War. Tensions in the region would continue both with and 
without Chinese involvement during the 1970s. Despite losing territory in the Paracels, 
through forcing the Philippines out of the Spratly Island chain, Vietnam would eventually 
gain control of twenty seven features within the Spratly group (Raine & Le Miere, 2013, p. 
33).  
 
Following a period of relative inactivity on the Tibetan frontier, during the 1980s Sino-
Indian, interaction on the border dispute was reinstated. From the early 1980s China and 
India undertook a series of Eight-Round border talks intended to re-engage negotiation on the 
border issue. The talks highlighted the continued position of China regarding settlement 
through compromising on the package deal proposed in the earlier negotiations. While India 
ultimately agreed to allow negotiations to proceed, the uncompromising position of India 
remained unchanged. The talks ultimately resulted in a determination to improve Sino-Indian 
relations through alternate measures to dispute resolution, including improved diplomatic and 
economic relations (Liu, 2011, pp. 153-154). While good-will relationships improved on the 
border, Indian military involvement in the same location as had sparked the 1962 conflict, 
threatened to draw the states into conflict again in 1987. China would not be drawn into 
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conflict as it had been decades earlier and, despite the hostility on the border, the established 
diplomatic measures continued nevertheless. 
 
Following this, India and China entered an unprecedented period of cooperation and 
understanding regarding the border. This began with visits of the countries’ respective Prime 
Ministers in 1988 to discuss the border, with the decision to establish a joint working group 
being made at this time. Diplomatic visits continued, with Li Peng requesting the move 
towards settlement be expedited from 1991 (Fravel, 2008, p. 169). Renewed negotiations led 
to an eventual agreement between the two states in 1993, which recognised the status quo of 
the boundary in the ‘line of actual control’, and reaffirmed India’s recognition of Tibet as a 
part of China. That the dispute was not resolved, however, was noted in the agreement 
through the understanding that recognition of the line of actual control did not ‘prejudice 
respective positions on the boundary question’ (Maxwell, 1999, p. 916). A further 1996 
agreement promoted friendly relations through the inclusion of articles agreeing not to use 
force in the dispute, and reduced military presence on the border to a level compatible with 
friendly relations (Maxwell, 1999, p. 916). Additionally, in 1996, China once again reiterated 
its ‘package deal’ offer to India, but without success (Fravel, 2008, p. 169).   
 
While China was building confidence with its Indian neighbours, in the South China Sea 
tensions rose in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988 China re-established territorial 
holdings in the Spratly Islands. China’s occupation of Spratly Island features acted as the 
catalyst for the Battle of Johnson South Reef with Vietnam, and resulted in the death of 
seventy-four Vietnamese seamen (Raine & Le Miere, 2013, pp. 41-44). China further 
expanded its territorial holdings in the Spartly Islands in 1994 with the occupation of 
Mischief Reef. Diplomatically, tensions increased in 1992 when China’s National People’s 
Congress signalled the significance it gave to the dispute by passing a territory law which 
declared the South China Sea as Chinese internal waters.  This law reasserted China’s claims 
under the Chinese interpretation of the provisions of UNCLOS. Additionally, through passing 
the law, China internally legitimised the potential use of force within the region, including in 
the identification of vessels and submarines, and the eviction of unfriendly vessels from the 
disputed area. The response from ASEAN nations which reciprocated the Chinese indications 
was unsurprising, with disputant states assuring China that violation of their sovereign 
territory with military force would be met in kind (Buszynski, 2003, p. 347). 
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From the mid-1990s China shifted its policy towards the rival claimant states from insistence 
on bilateral negotiation (seen as favouring China’s relative economic and military power in 
the region), to cooperative multilateral talks. In response to China passing the territorial law, 
ASEAN states expressed the desire to develop a code of conduct to protect them against the 
growing threat from China. Beginning in 1995, China began negotiations with ASEAN over 
a proposed code of conduct for the South China Sea. The code of conduct would prevent 
further expansion by claimant states in the area and would provide the basis for multilateral 
cooperation over resources within the area. Drafted primarily by China, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam, the proposed code allowed ASEAN to gain greater regional integration and stability 
against the relatively powerful China; and also allowed China to guard against an 
intensification of United States influence among ASEAN states. The agreement was 
eventually reduced from a legally binding document to a declaration of principles, which 
followed controversy around the definition of the disputed area, and the prevention of 
military activity from external states. Ultimately, the Declaration on Conduct was signed at 
the 8
th
 ASEAN summit by ASEAN and China, in November 2002 (Buszynski, 2003, p. 347). 
 
The twenty-first century has seen the improved relations between India and China involve 
several assertions by India to the recognition of Tibet as an autonomous region of China. 
Despite occasional tensions and threats of violence along the border since 1996, the status 
quo in recognition of the line of actual control has not changed. Liu characterises the period 
of improved relations in the 1990s between India and China as bookended by the promise of 
the 1988 Prime Ministerial visit to Beijing, and the 1998 Indian nuclear tests (Liu, 2011, p. 
155). Yet given the general maintenance of the status quo of the border since the agreements 
of the 1990s, the significance of the nuclear tests on the border dispute itself is debatable, as 
is the significance of other high level interstate relations removed from the issue of the border 
dispute. Ultimately, the border issue has remained unresolved despite apparent joint efforts to 
address it.   
 
Likewise, the ostensible move towards resolution in the South China Sea dispute appeared to 
be realised with the establishment of two further agreements, though to date little meaningful 
resolution has been achieved. The 2003 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which saw 
ASEAN and China pledge not to undertake any action which could threaten the stability of 
the region, and the trilateral Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) signed between 
China, the Philippines and Vietnam in an effort to undertake cooperative resource 
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development, brought with them a sense of ease for the region. These agreements provided 
only a temporary reprieve from tensions. However, ‘it was increasingly clear that the 
fundamental underlying lack of trust among the parties was continuing to encourage the 
militarisation of these disputes’ (Raine & Le Miere, 2013, p. 48). Subsequent legal 
approaches to the dispute have done little to aid its resolution. Submissions to the UN on 
continental shelf claims originating from the Philippines, and from a joint submission from 
Malaysia and Vietnam, resulted in protests from China, urging its members not to consider 
such a submission (Communication received with regard to the joint submission, 2009). 
Recent attempts by the Philippines to initiate arbitration regarding maritime delimitation in 
the South China Sea have also been rejected by China, who has reiterated its ‘indisputable 
sovereignty’ over the region based on historical activities and mapped in the nine-dash line 
from before the establishment of the PRC (Chinese government's Position Paper, 2014). 
 
Finally, China has also had minor clashes with both Vietnam and the Philippines over the 
disputed area in recent times. In March 2011, two Chinese fishing vessels shadowed an oil 
exploration ship from the Philippines, and in May of the same year cut the towing lines of 
equipment used by two Vietnamese ships looking for oil on separate occasions, once through 
the use of a Chinese paramilitary vessel, and once through the use of a fishing vessel (Raine 
& Le Miere, 2013, p. 49). China has also used weapons to intimidate fishermen from both 
countries operating within the disputed area (Sutter, 2011, p. 68). In April 2012, China used 
military intimidation against the Philippines in an area subject to dispute, briefly resulting in 
an embargo being placed on Filipino banana exports and a blockade of Filipino ships from 
the area (Goh, 2012). In 2014 Chinese and Vietnamese vessels collided over oil exploitation 
rights in waters disputed by the two states (Vietnam and China ships 'collide in South China 
Sea', 2014).  
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IV Literature Review 
Existing literature on the topic of Chinese territorial disputes is considerable, however 
comprehensive comparative analysis of various disputes and the reasons for associated 
Chinese behaviour has been limited to date. Studies of individual disputes, particularly those 
which were longstanding or remain unresolved (India, the South China Sea, Japan) are 
notable for their prevalence, particularly in non-academic writing.  Noting that the purpose of 
this thesis is to provide a comparison of maritime and frontier disputes, the intention of this 
chapter is not to provide comprehensive coverage of all existing literature on the various 
individual disputes. Instead, an overview of the common academic perspectives and 
theoretical approaches applied to the study of China’s territorial disputes will be provided. 
Where comparative studies of various disputes have been undertaken, these will be explored 
in more detail. 
 
International Relations approaches to the disputes predominantly draw on realist approaches. 
These are themselves focussed on neo-realist concepts of external threats and state alignment 
in the international system, rather than on the more classical realist considerations of state 
expansion and economic and territorial self-interest. China’s predominantly concessionary 
behaviour and the relative unimportance of much of the land in dispute largely preclude 
analysis typical of classical realism. Predictions of an expansive China sustained by growing 
state power are not supported by historical concessions which conceded large tracts of 
territory to smaller, weaker states, as with Burma. Furthermore, briefly setting maritime 
disputes aside, much of the territory in question here is sparsely populated hill country 
offering few material benefits (Department of State, 1964, pp. 1-2; Fravel, 2008, p. 50). The 
obvious exception to this is the Aksai Chin area, which held strategic importance to China 
due to the roadway connecting the regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. However, classical realist 
concepts which assume a state will expand where possible cannot explain why the Chinese 
would incorporate Aksai Chin into negotiations with India. Given that Chinese control over 
Aksai Chin was already established long before the dispute, little material gain could be made 
through such an approach.  
 
In line with the theories of Waltz and other neo-realists, a number of authors have argued that 
China’s behaviour can be viewed as being influenced by its alignment in the international 
system. Of note here is Hyer (1990), who is one of the few authors to have undertaken a 
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systematic study of various Chinese disputes. Hyer argues that the central determinant for 
Chinese behaviour should be seen as being the triangulate alignment of India, China, and the 
Soviet Union. For Hyer, China’s behaviour ‘can be explained by the hypothesis that the 
PRC’s approach to a dispute is determined by its perception of the balance of power in the 
region, acute threat perception and corresponding foreign policy which in turn determines 
policy towards a specific dispute’ (Hyer, 1990, p. 7). For the disputes relevant to this paper, 
settlements in the early 1960s are understood to have been made in pursuit of higher-level 
regional alliances rather than any kind of territorial integrity, which is the subject of the 
disputes (Hyer, 1990, p. 23). Proposed settlement with India and settlement with Burma are 
classed as actions undertaken within the context of China’s worsening relationship with the 
Soviets and Chinese fears of the Soviet Union’s increasingly good relations with India. 
Conversely, war with India is seen by Hyer as the result of a Chinese response to continued 
Indian pressure through the forward policy, with the swift resolution of the war seen as 
reflective of China’s concern of the threat from the Soviet Union and a disinclination to ‘get 
dragged into a quagmire in India also’ (Hyer, 1990, p. 136). 
 
Similar realist orientated studies can be found in those of Sun and Huang (2012) and Nie  
(2009). Respectively, these studies emphasise the importance of the encirclement of China by 
regional great powers, and the interrelationship of external states’ foreign policy as either 
revisionist or status quo states. Like Hyer, these authors broadly view external pressures and 
regional balance of power considerations as central to the Chinese decision-making process. 
Neighbouring states can be seen to be soliciting behaviour from China by acting with status 
quo or expansionist characteristics, resulting in Chinese concession of escalation or disputes 
respectively. The strength of China’s actions is seen to be based on the increase of Chinese 
power compared to those states with which disputes are shared. Maxwell (1999) draws 
similar (though more nuanced) conclusions when examining the Sino-Indian dispute 
specifically, assessing China’s decision to use force against India as the result of India’s 
continued aggressive use of the ‘forward policy’ and unwillingness to compromise, policies 
which presumably appeared to the Chinese as ‘expansionist’.  
 
An alternative approach sees the settlement and escalation of the disputes as an action which 
provides a means to other foreign policy ends, described by Wiegand (2009) as ‘issue 
linkage’ and ‘coercive diplomacy’. Such an approach can be found in Watson (1966), who 
argues that concession against broad, irredentist claims with smaller states served to allow 
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China to coerce the more powerful India and the Soviet Union. This is attempted, though 
unsuccessfully in the case of India, by establishing an image of China as conforming to the 
‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’. This characterisation is given to the Burmese 
settlement by Watson. Furthermore, Watson highlights the need for the Chinese to refuse 
acceptance of the McMahon line, lest they implicitly accept the twentieth century sovereignty 
of Tibet as an independently party to the Simla conference (Watson, 1966, p. 91). Yet while it 
is certainly true that the Chinese sought to draw on the image of peaceful and cooperative 
Asian relations, such an analysis does little to illustrate why the areas exchanged in the 
Burmese agreement were chosen, nor why maritime disputes have failed to be settled. 
 
Issue linkages have been raised by other authors in relation to China’s other disputes. 
Wiegand (2009) has argued that coercive diplomacy and issue linkage are central to 
understanding China’s strategy in its dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu / Senkaku Island 
group. Wiegand states that ‘China has been able to take advantage of the endurance of its 
territorial dispute with Japan and use it as bargaining leverage to achieve shifts in Japanese 
foreign policy regarding other disputed issues’ (2009, p. 171). Garver (2011), associates the 
continuation of the Sino-Indian dispute with Chinese deterrence of Indian interests in Tibet 
more generally. For Garver, the importance of the dispute for both India and China is the role 
of those State’s nationalism in perceiving Tibet as being within their sphere of influence. For 
China, maintenance of the border dispute allows pressure to be exerted on India when it 
appears the latter is overreaching in Tibet.  While it is not clear in this interpretation why 
China so steadfastly pursued settlement through concession throughout the dispute, Garver’s 
arguments offer one of the most explicit appeals to concepts of national identity outside of 
constructivist literature, and largely support the arguments made later in this paper.  
 
As with many of the articles listed above, it is commonplace for scholarship of Chinese 
territory disputes to focus on individual disputes (Fravel, 2008, p. 4), or to compare frontier 
disputes while choosing to leave maritime disputes unexamined. Fravel’s work on the topic 
represents the notable exception to this, and provides an interpretation of the discrepancies 
between the two types of dispute. As such, extended discussion of this work is worthwhile 
here. For Fravel (2008), state behaviour in territorial disputes is determined by internal 
threats and regime stability in instances of cooperation and concession, and in the relative 
bargaining power of a state (territorial holdings and force projection), of which a decline 
leads to instances of aggression. Accordingly, concessions made to India and Burma are said 
32 
 
 
 
to derive from the need for assistance from these states to maintain control over Tibet 
following the 1959 crisis. Alternatively, when Fravel addresses China’s maritime disputes his 
emphasis turns to the as yet unrealised economic and energy exploitability of the South China 
Sea (2008, p. 276).  Maritime disputes are noted as being delayed in response in order to 
maintain access to this potential exploitability, with moments of escalation occurring as 
disputant states expanded their holding throughout the late twentieth century. 
 
The appeal to the economic and strategic significance of the South China Sea is common. 
Further scholarship which supports this view can be found in the work of Garver (1992), who 
argues that while Chinese interest in the region was previously motivated by strategic 
concerns, it has since moved to the pursuit of economically exploitable resources based on 
maritime claims and concerns regarding continental resource limitations. Likewise, Zhao 
(2013) views China’s energy needs and oil resources in the region as a key behavioural driver 
in the dispute. Such analysis typically views the economic benefits of the region with the 
ability to claim exclusive economic zones (EEZ) under the provisions of the UNCLOS, 
allowing for control over the associated fisheries and energy resources. Yet the establishment 
of an EEZ unrecognised by the international community is unlikely to provide easily 
exploitable rights for China, which would be required for the impact of UNCLOS to have 
significance. The immediate salience of energy resources for China is also low, with the 
majority of China’s energy coming from coal or alternate sources of oil (Curtis, 2014). 
China’s best option for the exploitation of these resources, without the use of force, would be 
through cooperation with neighbour states, cooperation which has been limited and 
undermined to date.  
 
Furthermore, neo-realist arguments in favour of regional alignment in the South China Sea 
are also undermined by recent actions of hostility, which have coincided with increased 
attention in the region from the United States. Were Chinese concessionary behaviour aligned 
to its relative position within the international system, the signalled ‘pacific rebalance’ of the 
United States should have instead resulted in cooperative behaviour from China with smaller 
South East Asian states to prevent their alignment with the opposing great power. Instead, 
aggressive military and diplomatic Chinese behaviour has resulted in renewed military ties 
between the United States and disputant countries Vietnam and the Philippines, further 
limiting the strategic gains China could potentially realise in the region (Curtis, 2014).  
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Another shortfall of Fravel’s analysis, and of the approaches examined above, is the inability 
of these approaches to explain the significance and instigation of the PRC’s disputes without 
drawing on ideas of historical national identity. Where the importance of these variables is 
noted, these are often dismissed in favour of approaches limited to examining the subsequent 
behaviour of China in existing disputes. Speaking from a theoretical perspective, the 
dismissal of ideational variables in Fravel’s analysis leaves this work significantly 
incomplete. While Fravel addresses ideational variables, he views these solely from the point 
of view of international norms, specifically the prevalence of the norm of respect for 
territorial sovereignty following World War II. Fravel dismisses this view as being unable to 
account for when concessions of territory are given (2008, p. 25). Such analysis - which 
focuses on ideational variables only at the level of the international community - misses the 
potential to analyse states as aligning their actions to their own varying national identity, that 
is, their undertaking actions to maintain ontological security. As with most studies on this 
topic, the implicit importance of these variables is nevertheless apparent in Fravel’s work. 
When discussing frontier disputes, Fravel notes the importance for the PRC of the 
consolidation of ‘the territorial integrity of an “empire state” that continued the ethnic 
geography of previous dynasties’ (Fravel, 2008, p. 44). However, despite this 
acknowledgement, the importance of the maintenance of authority in Tibet through territorial 
settlement is seen in fundamentally realist terms; the repression of Tibetan rebels aided by 
neighbouring states is important because of the strategic importance of Tibet. Any potential 
for ideational questions provided for maritime disputes is not given, and therefore whether 
the differences that arise between the two types of dispute are related to ideas of identity 
cannot be assessed. 
 
The continuous implicit importance of ideational variables in existing literature is readily 
identified. In Donnelly’s critique of realist theory, discussions on identity within realist 
scholarship are identified as usually being ‘done unwittingly… neo-classical realists do have 
theoretical space for identity, but few have pursued the issue systematically’ (Donnelly, 2009, 
pp. 48-49). This awareness but lack of prioritisation of China’s internal national identity, as it 
relates to borderlands and the ethnic minorities that populate them, is commonplace in studies 
of China’s borderland behaviour in its territorial disputes. For example, Hyer recognises 
central China’s interaction with minorities as a key theme in the historical manifestation of 
China adopted by the Communist government, which act as a key determinant for where 
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disputes arose. However, Hyer views ethnic minorities as an impediment to behaviour taking 
place within the international systems, stating (Hyer, 1990): 
 
The obsession with the historical dimensions of China and contemporary security 
concerns have combined to make the resolution of long standing boundary conflicts 
difficult, unless international systemic factors make it necessary for China to make 
territorial compromises in order to ensure more vital national interests (p. 77). 
 
Similar comments can be found in virtually all other authors discussing China’s territorial 
disputes. Garver notes in different studies that ‘China’s campaigns in the South China Sea 
have been…inspired by a sense of destiny spanning centuries’ (1992, p. 1028), and that 
Chinese sovereignty in the Sino-Indian dispute was ‘vested conceptually in the people’ 
(2011, p. 103). Nie’s analysis concedes that ‘ideological positions might, under certain 
circumstances, have an impact on China’s handling of border disputes, [but] they are by no 
means the only explanatory factor’ (Nie, 2009, p. 489). Nationalism and zealous irredentist 
claims regarding the historical conception of borders is also a notable argumentative 
approach, from which Maxwell (1999) maintains that the lack of progress in the Sino-Indian 
dispute was the result of the clash of these variables between the two disputant states.  
 
These aspects of identity and history have been approached by constructivist scholars. 
However, while demonstrating the relevance of these variables more substantially, these 
works are limited in their application across the full scope of China’s disputes. For example, 
reflecting criticism of alternative approaches use of identity, history and nationalism for 
coercive diplomacy discussed above, Suzuki (2014, p. 24) notes that such approaches 
trivialise the socialisation of historical interstate interaction into identity, as well as the 
subsequent impact of this on state interests. Offering a more nuanced approach, Suzuki 
(2014, pp. 34-36) argues that Chinese national identity has been formed through its 
interactions with external states acting as ‘Others’ to the Chinese ‘Self’. Focusing principally 
on the Sino-Japanese relationship, this identity draws on Japan’s historical occupation of 
China, informing China’s identification as a victim of imperialism, and allowing a narrative 
of unique moralism to arise. Similarly, and in an argument reflecting that provided below, 
Gustafsson (2014) employs the ontological security approach to demonstrate how internal 
Chinese education has moved to secure contemporary Chinese identification as a ‘victim’ 
through patriotic education when it has been challenged by revisionist Japanese 
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interpretations of the occupation of China. Although these scholars demonstrate the 
importance of interstate relations in forming ideational narrative recognised as pertinent to 
Chinese disputes, the subsequent implications of this to direct interstate behaviour is not 
clear.  
 
Concepts of Chinese national identity have been applied directly to territory disputes. 
However, while supporting the importance of concepts posited by this thesis, these studies 
are limited to observations of Chinese identities in relation to a single external state. For 
example, in an argument closely reflecting this thesis, Guang (2006) argues that the 1962 
border war occurred following Indian threats to China’s identity as an emerging sovereign 
nation, particularly relating to the status of Tibet within it. However, in being limited to 
causes of conflict, Guang’s argument cannot explain the Chinese pursuit of settlement on the 
border in 1960, the delayed initiation of this negotiation following the establishment of the 
PRC, or the move to cooperative behaviour on the border at a time when national identity 
relative to Tibet was under threat in the late twentieth century. Instead, this thesis argues that 
such an approach is overly simplistic, and that the security (or insecurity) of China’s identity 
as a sovereign nation in fact impacted Chinese behaviour throughout the dispute, including its 
maintenance; subsequent moves to settle the borders; and the resulting conflict in 1962.  
 
General differences in theoretical approaches aside, the primary significance of this thesis to 
International Relations scholarship is therefore in its expansion of existing approaches to 
China’s behaviour in territory disputes, by looking Chinese identity as a central determinant 
across a variety of disputes. Rather than viewing the interactions of central China’s 
ontological relationship with populated and uninhabited borderlands as a sideshow to higher 
matters of Chinese foreign policy (as with realist scholarship), or by focusing on the 
interaction of China’s national identity relative to a single external state, this paper argues 
that the presence of minorities perceived as Chinese is a determining variable across Chinese 
border behaviour. In short, border settlement is argued to occur when China perceives that the 
settlement, or the actions of the disputant country, helps to legitimise China’s incorporation 
of a wider population into the Chinese state. It is in this regard also that this paper most 
significantly diverges from existing comparative studies of maritime and frontier disputes. 
Rather than maritime disputes being seen as a delayed pursuit for unrealised resources, the 
absence of a local population sees China’s approach become dependent on China’s 
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ontological relationship with the external state. Detailed support for this argument is provided 
below.  
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V Chinese National Identity in its Territorial Disputes 
In his analysis of the PRC’s shelling of Jinmen Island in 1958 - part of the ongoing desire of 
the PRC to ‘liberate’ Taiwan – Chen (2001) identifies several ideological points as the 
predominant factors in the Chinese motivation for the attack. The first relates to the need to 
unify and ‘mobilise’ the Chinese people leading up to the ‘Great Leap forward’, allowing the 
Chinese people to move on to the next socioeconomic level in their move towards a 
communist society. The second aspect of Chinese ideology in the Jinmen shelling is 
international, and relates to the need for the Chinese to challenge American interference in 
China’s affairs. That this was more ideological than material, is supported by the rhetoric of 
Mao and other Chinese leaders, which placed the unity of the Chinese people, expressed as 
‘Tianxia’ (all under heaven), above China’s physical security through potential reprisal 
(2001, “Dancing” with Moscow, para. 5). Thus, Chen’s analysis highlights two aspects of 
Chinese national identity, which can each be applied as the predominate determinant in 
China’s frontier and maritime disputes. These relate to China’s domestic understanding of the 
unity of the Chinese people, and the influence of China within Asia internationally.  
 
This chapter will outline the history of Chinese national identity under the PRC. This first 
section will explore the key concepts of Chinese national identity as they relate to China’s 
disputes, referring specifically to the significance of unity among the Chinese people, the 
‘Century of Humiliation’, and ‘Chinese exceptionalism’. The chapter will go on to argue that, 
broadly speaking, the development of these concepts can account for the lack of 
acknowledgement of border issues by the PRC prior to the late 1950s, and the subsequent 
cooperation in these disputes during the 1960s, and the late 1980s and 1990s. As will become 
clear, the concepts of Chinese national identity discussed here are closely interrelated. 
However, while the unification of the various peoples of China is central to frontier disputes, 
it cannot be applied to the uninhabited islands of the South China Sea, resulting in a 
divergence of Chinese behaviour across the two types of dispute. 
A Chinese National Identity: Exceptionalism, Humiliation and Unity. 
‘Chinese exceptionalism’, as identified by Zhang, has been manifest in Chinese ideology and 
foreign policy throughout Chinese history, during which it can be identified in various but 
interrelated iterations. The central theme of this ideology can broadly be found in imperial 
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China, and is fundamentally related to the tributary system discussed above, in which (Zhang, 
2011): 
  
The Chinese perceived, and more frequently, presented Zhongguo (China, literally ‘the 
Central State’) as the centre of the known world, and superior to other polities culturally, 
morally, and materially… China would include other polities in its foreign policy domain 
and promote their development and prosperity under the influence and constraints of 
Chinese civilisation (p. 308).  
 
China thus presented and understood itself as a great power which, in line with the ideologies 
of the tianxia, would draw its neighbours into its cultural sphere for their own wellbeing. The 
prosperity provided by such an ideology existed within a hierarchy which required other 
nations to exist within their proper place relative to the Zhongguo. For the PRC, the 
inheritance of this ideology was intermingled with both the communist ideological 
framework of the CCP and the historical legacy of China’s suffering under imperial powers 
during the ‘Century of Humiliation.’ Despite the limited material strength of the PRC, ‘in 
many ways, Mao and his comrades still regarded China as a ‘special country’ in the world, 
and they sought to re-establish China’s central, if not dominant, position in world affairs’ 
(Zhang, 2011, p. 309). China in the mid-1950s, therefore, still identified itself as the ‘Central 
Kingdom’, morally superior to other states, even whilst attempting to distance itself from the 
ideology of the Imperial Empire.   
 
As noted, the great-power entitlement and moral superiority adhered to by the PRC was 
driven by the Century of Humiliation. The Century of Humiliation is possibly the 
predominant historical narrative of the modern Chinese state, and in keeping with Steele’s 
ontological security theory, represents the main biographical narrative through which Chinese 
identity is understood. It represents the period beginning with the British and the Opium wars 
of the 1840s and traces the history of subjugation of the Chinese people to foreign powers 
and the loss of territory through unequal treaties, some of which are the subject of this paper. 
Upon the success of the 1949 revolution, Mao declared that ‘Ours will no longer be a nation 
subject to insult and humiliation’ and the cleansing of humiliation became a goal of China’s 
foreign policy (Callahan, 2004, pp. 202-203). Far from representing a self-defeating 
victimhood, the concept of national humiliation provides the context through which the re-
ascension to China’s moral and material great power status can be achieved. As Callahan 
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explains, ‘the narrative of national salvation depends upon national humiliation; the narrative 
of national security depends on national insecurity’ (Callahan, 2004, p. 203). The 
transformation of China was central to the goals of the CCP’s revolution. Chen’s analysis of 
Mao’s ideological stance, dominant in the PRC’s early years, was to ‘transform China’s state, 
population, and society, simultaneously reasserting China’s central position in the world’ 
(Chen, 2001, Ideology Matters, para. 6).  
 
The Century of Humiliation has been used at different times to express Chinese national 
identity both outwardly, informing the international community of China’s position in world 
affairs, and internally, emphasising the importance of solidarity in the Chinese nation. During 
the revolutionary period of the PRC, prior to Deng Xiaoping’s reform period in the 1980s, the 
Century of Humiliation pervaded Chinese rhetoric regarding interstate relations. 
Domestically, this period saw the expression of the Chinese nation as united through socialist 
ideologies and class struggle, although it was implicit that the successes of these would in 
turn move China away from humiliation. Later in the late twentieth century, when Chinese 
power was assumed to be a matter of fact, the concept of Chinese national humiliation itself 
was also redirected inwards, replacing socialist and communist ideologies as the unifying 
characteristic of the Chinese nation. Infused with anti-foreign rhetoric, and enshrined in 
official maps, textbooks, and national holidays, national humiliation was employed 
proactively as propaganda, for the purpose of enhancing domestic Chinese nationalism 
(Callahan, 2009).  
 
Despite the changing focus of the Century of Humiliation, the unification of the Chinese 
people has also remained a narrative of significance for the modern Chinese state, in which 
China is perceived as a ‘unitary multi-national state created jointly by the people of all its 
nationalities’, expressed in China as douyuan ti (Callahan, 2009, p. 136). The relationship 
between the Han and China’s national minorities (the latter located along the frontiers of the 
Chinese state), formed a central aspect of the CCP’s ideology both prior to, and following, 
1949. The PRC sought to diverge from imperial and Republican Chinese representations of 
minorities as people to be excluded or subjugated, seeking to incorporate the frontier people 
into the Chinese state (Callahan, 2009, p. 128). Prior to the establishment of the PRC, CCP 
policy during the 1930s stated that upon the success of the revolution, minorities would have 
the option to secede from the Chinese state. Upon the founding of the PRC in 1949, the 
policy had changed to one of autonomy for national minorities within the unified Chinese 
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state, in which autonomous national minorities would act to strengthen the territorial integrity 
of China, rather than to secede and detract from it (Callahan, 2009, p. 137). From the late 
1950s, the initiation and subsequent failure of the Great Leap Forward, the continued 
legitimacy of the PRC and the continuous revolution, and particularly Mao’s authority over 
it, would see an alignment of foreign policy with themes of Chinese unification and 
nationalism. Indeed, the history of the PRC during the twentieth century ultimately saw the 
notion of national unity had become so central to the elevation of China as a great-power that 
‘fragmentation constitutes one of the worst crimes left in China; the worst epithet is not 
capitalist or counterrevolutionary, but splittist’ (Callahan, 2004, p. 209). 
 
It is in this context that the characterisation of territory disputes as unfair and unequal can be 
understood. The management of the disputes by the PRC acts to legitimise the authority of 
the PRC, as well as by affirming Chinese exceptionalism and the rise of China out of national 
humiliation. While, like Fravel, it is tempting to view Chinese nationalism as likely to 
demonstrate a stubborn, aggressive and irredentist China intent on reclaiming the past 
territorial glory of the Qing, this is overly simplistic. Instead, in relation to the theory of 
ontological security, the changing pertinence of the above ontologies aligns with behavioural 
changes which are undertaken in an effort to provide ontological security. Thus, Chinese 
identity can be served by territory disputes through concession which aligns with China’s 
perceived moral superiority over external states, and the legitimisation of the incorporation of 
minorities which assists in the unity of the Chinese people. Likewise, China’s view of itself 
as the Central State can be secured through the influence or coercion of states internationally. 
Trends in the significance of these ontologies can be identified throughout the history of the 
PRC and applied to China’s disputes with its neighbours. During this history, the emphasis 
on China as an exceptional state amongst the international community can be viewed 
adjacent to activity relating to China’s maritime disputes; while periods in which the 
domestic integrity of the Chinese population becomes central to Chinese goals can be viewed 
adjacent to periods of activity in China’s frontier disputes. Both of these types of activity can 
further be incorporated into the biographical narrative of China’s accession, and later 
protection from, national humiliation. 
B The 1950s, Chinese Exceptionalism and National Humiliation 
The 1950s represents a period of ontological insecurity for China in relation to its place 
within the international environment. This insecurity was manifest in the PRC’s 
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preoccupation with its external relations, and an unrelenting desire to be viewed as a 
significant and superior state, and as the centre of international communism. In the first half 
of the decade, China’s relations with the Soviet Union remained intact, yet China remained 
subordinate to the Soviets and on the periphery of international affairs more generally. 
Nevertheless, Zhang (2011) characterises Chinese exceptionalism in the 1950s as exhibiting 
what he describes as ‘revolutionary sinocentrism’, ‘great power entitlement’ and ‘moralism’. 
Consequently, ‘Mao and his comrades were first concerned with gaining China’s great power 
status and restoring its autonomy that had been lost in the previous century…this was all 
informed by the wrenching contrast between China’s past greatness and its recent suffering, 
as well as a profound sense of China’s historical destiny as a great power’ (Zhang, 2011, p. 
315). 
 
The 1950s saw Chinese foreign policy predominantly concerned with taking advantage of 
international events to align its perceived identity as a morally superior great power with its 
interactions and recognitions from other states. Chinese involvement in Korea was, therefore, 
articulated as the ‘movement to resist America’, and the focus of the movement was the 
creation of a powerful new China (Chen, 2001, The Alliance and China’s Korean War 
Experience, para. 14). The ultimate holding of the American and United Nations Forces to 
the 38
th
 parallel was claimed as a victory by the PRC. The Chinese further utilised peace talks 
in Geneva in 1954, at the end of the First Indochina War, to influence great powers including 
France and Britain. As noted above, the shelling of Jinmen in 1958 can also fit into this 
pursuit of Chinese exceptionalism. During the crises in 1956 in Poland and Hungary, senior 
PRC officials provided a significant level of council to the Soviets on the proper use of 
military intervention in these fellow Socialist countries, and criticised the Soviets for what 
China perceived to be ‘big-power chauvinism’ (Chen, 2001, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping 
in Moscow, para. 9).  
 
Reference to Chinese territorial dispute was limited during the 1950s, but it will be recalled 
that Chinese activity in relation to its disputes during this period occurred most significantly 
in the reiteration of Chinese sovereignty over the island groups in the South China Sea. In 
line with the predominant Chinese ontology during this time, Chinese statements regarding 
infringement of China’s sovereign rights make reference to shame and insult, conducive to 
the state of humiliation, which China was pursuing elevation from through its interstate 
behaviour. Thus, in its note to the South Vietnamese government concerning the alleged 
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kidnapping of Chinese fishermen from the Paracels, the Chinese government accuses the 
Vietnamese of violating the ‘sacred right of the Chinese people, which is absolutely not to be 
infringed on by anyone. But the South Vietnamese…want only to insult our national flag’ 
(Amerkar & Diverkar, 1964, pp. 216-217). This note goes on to demand that the South 
Vietnamese apologise for ‘slighting the national flag’.  
 
During this period, China had entered into a number of treaties of friendship with its 
borderland neighbours which, if not confirming China’s place as a great power, enhanced 
China’s standing within the region. This largely alleviated the need to pursue this status 
through the management of territorial disputes, explaining why China left these undefined 
throughout the 1950s, despite Indian and Burmese desires to discuss them. Furthermore, 
domestically the early 1950s was a time during which the PRC took a largely moderate 
approach to the incorporation of national minorities into the Chinese state. This period was 
envisioned as one of a gradual growing together of the Han and the minorities, in which the 
unity of the socialist Chinese state was to be undertaken ‘in conformity with the wishes of the 
masses’ (Dreyer, 1976, p. 94). While the CCP would undertake research missions into local 
minority populations, local officials were largely maintained and socialist ideology was 
promoted but not strictly enforced. If the settlement of territory disputes would ultimately be 
undertaken to reaffirm the unity of the Chinese, as argued here, there was little reason to 
undertake such a reaffirmation during this period. Instead, the above suggests a period of 
relative domestic ontological security for China in which moderate policies, while toned 
down from the right to secede of 1930s CCP policy, still acted to secure the self-perception 
that the PRC was diverging from the policies of Imperial and Nationalist China through 
which humiliation had occurred.  
 
From 1956 the political landscape began to change both domestically and internationally, 
with events acting to provide security to China’s identity as a globally significant power. The 
death of Stalin and efforts of de-Stalinisation undertaken by the Soviet Union allowed the 
PRC to present itself as a morally superior socialist nation. This, illustrated through China’s 
self-assumed, ideological advisory role to the Soviets during the Polish and Hungarian crises, 
had resulted in a self-perception of ‘Beijing’s virtual centrality in world communism’ (Chen, 
2001, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in Moscow, para. 9). Indeed this self-perception of the 
PRC as a central state in international communism was inherent when the party stated that 
‘China’s sovereignty had been restored’ (Hyer, 1990, p. 40). This comment is made in 
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relation to the PRC’s territorial integrity, emphasising external relations and the Chinese 
State’s position relative to them (Hyer, 1990): 
 
Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese people have 
completely abolished the concessions, leased territories, and consular jurisdiction which 
the United States, Britain, and other imperialist countries acquired in old China, thereby 
ending the humiliating position of China as a semi-colony and restoring the states 
sovereignty and independence (p. 40). 
 
Thus, in the late 1950s, the attention of the CCP moved to the internal mobilisation of the  
Chinese people in order for China to achieve to a higher socioeconomic level, causing a shift 
in ontology which subjugated the identities of national minorities under that of a unified, 
socialist Chinese people.    
C The late 1950s, the 1960s, and the Domestic Mobilisation of Unified China.   
Increasingly, Mao and the PRC became preoccupied with the mobilisation of the Chinese 
people in order to facilitate the ‘Great Leap Forward’ - Mao’s ambitious attempt to advance 
the Chinese socialist state through economic and industrial expansion. From 1958 situations 
such as the Taiwan crisis were actively engaged, as it was believed by Chinese leaders that 
such international situations could ‘mobilise the population, could particularly mobilise the 
backward people, could mobilise the people in the middle, and could therefore promote the 
Great Leap Forward in economic construction’ (Chen, 2001, From Tension to Crisis, para. 
15). Undoubtedly Mao’s reference to the ‘backward’ and ‘middle’ people was towards 
national minorities of the frontier. The need for and emphasis of national unification can be 
identified in changes to the central government’s policies towards these people. The formerly 
moderate policy of respect for special differences in ethnic minorities was replaced with a 
change in the perception of the role minorities would play in China’s progress. ‘[For the 
Great Leap to succeed] clearly such an ambitious program required unity. Diversity became 
the antithesis of unity, ethnic diversity came to be regarded as a hindrance to the achievement 
of the Great Leap’s goals’ (Dreyer, 1976, p. 159). 
 
Eventually the pursuit of unity by the PRC under Mao would reach its zenith in the Cultural 
Revolution beginning in 1966, and representing the most assimilative period in the history of 
the PRC. During the Cultural Revolution the previous policy, of gradual progress and 
44 
 
 
 
unification of national minorities, coupled with the recognition of their differences, was 
replaced with a strict ideological emphasis on class struggle, in which ‘the idea that the 
various nationalities should follow their own culture became a casualty’ (Mackerras, 1994, 
pp. 150-153). Nevertheless by the beginning of the Cultural Revolution many of China’s 
territorial disputes had been resolved. It was in the years between the initiation of the Great 
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution that the majority of China’s territorial disputes 
were settled, or, in the case of India, that settlement was offered. These years (1958-1965) 
mark a period in the history of the PRC in which ontological security was pursued in part 
through re-routinizing China’s interactions with the states on its borders. Chinese unification 
became central to the biographical narrative of the PRC, with a unified socialist nation 
coming to be seen as analogous to the advancement of the Chinese state particularly 
following the Tibetan Revolt of 1959 (discussed below). During the period prior to the 
Cultural Revolution, the party still sought to incorporate minorities without wishing to 
assimilate them fully. In China’s frontier regions, where historical and contemporary 
interstate influence potentially imparted ambiguous influences on minority populations, the 
settlement of territorial disputes allowed the Chinese to reaffirm the explicit Chinese 
sovereignty over those minorities, providing external recognition of, and therefore security 
for, this aspect of China’s ontology. This is discussed in more detail relative to the Indian and 
Burmese border disputes below. However it is finally worth noting that issues relating to 
China’s frontier border disputes would not be raised again until the 1980s, after the extreme 
nationalities policy of the Cultural Revolution had begun to be removed by the PRC 
leadership (Mackerras, 1994, pp. 153-154), and in which new Chinese and minority 
nationalisms had begun to arise.  
1 The Burmese Settlement 
I have argued above that China’s settlement of territory disputes can be seen to align with 
periods in which the ontology of a united China was central to Chinese goals. However, the 
question remains as to how the Burmese settlement and the ongoing relations with India 
provided security for this aspect of Chinese identity. The Burmese settlement can be seen to 
provide a manner of ontological security for the Chinese in a number of ways, at least in its 
allusions to the Century of Humiliation through references to the illegitimate origins of the 
disputed border. It will be recalled that the Burmese had acknowledged that the border had 
been a product of foreign imperial politics of aggression (Watson, 1966, pp. 128-130). 
Furthermore the agreement was made with continued reference to the ‘Five Principles’. By 
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recognising the Chinese victimhood at the hands of imperial powers and by cooperating in 
negotiations allowing the PRC to remedy this status in line with the high morals of the ‘Five 
Principles’, the Burmese settlement confirmed for China both its moralistic superiority in 
interstate relations as well as its ascension from the Century of Humiliation. However the 
Century of Humiliation cannot be seen as the primary ontology being secured here, as 
settlement could have occurred for this purpose from the mid-1950s when Burma first 
approached China on the issue.  
 
Here, allusions to the Century of Humiliation should therefore be understood as situating this 
settlement within the narrative of advancement away from humiliation. The timing within the 
period of insecurity of Chinese unity sees this settlement act to reaffirm the Chinese 
nationality of the borderland people, and to prevent and control cross-border interaction 
between the minorities of Northern Burma and the Chinese frontier lands. Most explicitly, 
this occurred through clarification of tribal groups as coming under Chinese control - the so-
called ‘administrative clarification’ of the jurisdiction of villages and tribes along the 
boundary line. Where Chinese concession occurred in the provision of the Nanwan Tract to 
the Burmese, it was made explicit that this was in exchange for sovereignty over tribes for 
which China had historical ties. This indicates that the inclusion of tribal groups perceived as 
Chinese was of greater importance than territorial possession. In addition to comments on the 
undertaking of the settlement, the clarification of sovereignty over local tribes formed the 
majority of joint press communiqués issued following the settlement of the border (Amerkar 
& Diverkar, 1964, pp. 188-204). 
 
Additional evidence of this can be found in points presented in a note from Premier Chou En-
lai to the Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, in October 1960. The note is solely presented for 
the purpose of clarifying points related to the borderland peoples. Reiterating the purpose of 
the delimitation of tribes outlined in the border agreement, Chou writes that ‘the inhabitants 
of the areas to be handed over by one side to the other…shall, after handing over the areas, be 
definitely considered citizens of the side to which the areas belong’ (Amerkar & Diverkar, 
1964, p. 202). The definitive nature of this agreement was to follow a grace period in which 
the inhabitant could ‘declare their choice of nationality’, presumably meaning Chinese rather 
than the local national minority more likely to apply to the person in question. The note 
continues in outlining principles for the limiting of interaction between the border inhabitants 
(Amerkar & Diverkar, 1964): 
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In accordance with the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and in order to facilitate administration by each side and to avoid disputes 
between the border inhabitants…the two sides are of the agreed opinion that the question 
of cross border cultivation of trans-border lands, which exists now in the Sino-Burmese 
border area…should be settled…Each side shall see to it that no new cases of trans-
frontier cultivation shall be allowed by its inhabitants (p. 202). 
 
Following the border agreement, what was once a border over which certain minority peoples 
populated both sides, was now ‘“not so vulnerable to outside penetration” as they once had 
been’ (Mackerras, 1994, p. 190). While it is tempting to view this determination as the 
clarification of normal territorial principles, it should be recalled that until 1960 the PRC had 
been content to manage the border through the presence of the People’s Liberation Army, 
despite the claims to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Had China simply desired 
to clarify its territorial boundaries and their associated jurisdictions, why had China not 
undertaken settlement with Burma earlier in the 1950s following Burmese approaches to 
China regarding such settlement? It is more likely that this principle acted as a symbolic 
gesture, not only between the Burmese and the Chinese, but also to the Chinese people, 
signifying that those within the Chinese borders were an inalienable part of the unified 
Chinese nation. U Nu’s reply to the note, in which Chou’s note was reproduced in full before 
being confirmed on all points on behalf of the Government of Burma, was published in 
periodicals, meaning its existence was not kept to only the local level which the note 
concerns.  
 
The reaffirmation of the South Eastern minorities as part of the Chinese state in 1960 can be 
seen as arising for a number of reasons. The connections between these groups of minorities, 
particularly those in the Yunnan province bordering Burma, were those with which the CCP 
had the weakest connections prior to 1949. In the period of 1956-57, as part of the CCP’s 
research into local minority groups, the Yunnan people were further characterised as 
unwilling to progress the local minorities further towards socialist development despite the 
undertaking of democratic reforms and autonomous status in the region (Dreyer, 1976, pp. 
147-152). As discussed above, the progress towards a unified socialist society was central to 
the PRC’s domestic polices from 1958. The Burmese settlement therefore allowed the 
Chinese an opportunity to declare the indisputable Chinese nationality of the people within 
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the Burmese frontier and to have this confirmed by the nation from which potential conflicts 
of influence and identity had existed. The Chinese did not make this gesture until the time 
when the understanding of a unified Chinese people and their mobilisation was critical to the 
state’s central ontology. Likewise the concession of disputed land was possible both because 
territorial gain was not the desired outcome of the agreement, and because providing such a 
concession reaffirmed China’s perceived exceptional moral nature. 
2 India, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama: Concession and Conflict 
In the case of Tibet, the Chinese had been making explicit pronouncements of Chinese 
sovereignty over the Tibetan people long before the attempt at settling the dispute occurred, 
and the sparse nature of the frontier meant that ‘clarification’ of Chinese sovereignty over 
certain tribal groups could not be expressed as with Burma. Unlike the Chinese interaction 
with Burma, where internal transformations to China’s ontology caused a need to change its 
interactions with Burma to provide security, the Indian settlement arose from both these 
internal ontological changes, as well as what China saw as India’s facilitation of the major 
threat to the unified China ontology represented by the Tibetan separatist movement. China 
therefore moved to realign its interactions with India by formalising the border as the 
boundary of the Chinese state thereby providing security for the inclusion of Tibet within 
China through recognition of this from India. Despite opportunities to settle the dispute 
earlier, the offer to settle did not occur until the threat to China’s ontology had manifested. In 
January 1959, prior to the rebellion in Tibet, the Chinese government responded to Indian 
protests against maps including parts of the disputed territory with no move towards seeking 
settlement, and instead suggested the status quo be maintained as changes would ‘give rise to 
confusion among our people’ (Amerkar & Diverkar, 1964, p. 118). Given the construction of 
the Chinese road in the area, the Indian protests had sought clarification from the Chinese of 
their claim to the Aksai Chin. That the Chinese did not pursue settlement at this point, 
illustrates that the timing and significance of the Chinese offer in 1960 was not motivated 
primarily by maintaining the security of this strategic interest.  
 
The Tibetan revolt in Lhasa in March 1959 represented for the PRC one of the most 
significant threats to national unity it had experienced. Tibetan rebels were accused of 
‘betraying the motherland and the people and undermining the national unity’ (Smith Jr., 
2009, p. 53). More broadly, Tibet in general was subsequently perceived to have ‘not 
accepted the socialist road as the ‘inevitable trend of the development of history and the 
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common desire of the people of all nationalities’ (Smith Jr., 2009, p. 52). Following the Dalai 
Lama’s escape to India, ‘democratic reforms’ were initiated by the CCP in order to 
strengthen Tibet’s place within the Chinese socialist state. However, the ontological integrity 
of Tibet as Chinese remained under threat when, despite assurances to the contrary by the 
Indian government, the Dalai Lama was able to make repeated political criticism of Chinese 
rule in Tibet from his sanctuary in India. While India had previously affirmed its recognition 
of Tibet as Chinese, its unwillingness to denounce the Dalai Lama and its criticism of 
Chinese actions in Tibet drew harsh criticism from the Chinese government (Mackerras, 
1994, p. 180), and disrupted the Sino-Indian relationship which had held India recognition of 
a Chinese Tibet as routine.   
 
This threat to Chinese unity and its connection with the Sino-Indian border can be seen in 
communications between India and China in September 1959. As of the 8
th
 of September, a 
letter from Chou En-Lai continued to allude to the Century of Humiliation. Referencing 
British attempts to create an independent Tibet in the eighteenth century, Chou cited that 
were the Chinese to accept the ‘illegal’ McMahon Line, itself a ‘product of the British Policy 
of aggression’, China would ‘disgrace itself’ (Amerkar & Diverkar, 1964, p. 126). Yet at this 
time, still no suggestion of settlement or concession was made. This changed abruptly in the 
following days. On the 9
th
 of September 1959, having been given assent by Nehru, the Dalai 
Lama’s challenges to Chinese rule in Tibet reached their zenith when he approached the 
United Nations requesting intervention on the Tibetan issue (Mackerras, 1994, p. 180). In 
this, the Dalai Lama directly challenged the right of the Chinese to sovereignty over the 
Tibetan people, stating that ‘no power of authority was exercised by the Government of 
China in or over Tibet since the Declaration of Independence by the 13
th
 Dalai Lama in 1912’ 
(Amerkar & Diverkar, 1964, p. 456). Only two days later, the Chinese People’s Congress 
internally determined their position on the territory dispute for the first time, articulating what 
would eventually be offered in the ‘package’ deal to India in April of the following year, 
including the acceptance of the border along the illegal McMahon Line (Hyer, 1990, pp. 131-
132).  
 
From that time Chinese pursuit of negotiations with India began. In the Chinese 
government’s response to the United Nations, it is clear that the Chinese viewed the Dalai 
Lama’s approach to the international community as a threat, not only to their position in 
Tibet, but to the ontology of a united China. This response was issued the following month, 
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stating that the Dalai Lama and the United Nations ‘absolutely cannot affect the advance of 
the Chinese people of various nationalities, including the Tibetan people, united as one 
[emphasis added], on the road of prosperity and happiness’ (Amerkar & Diverkar, 1964, p. 
463). Likewise from this point, Chinese communications with India on the border issue began 
to allude to negotiations towards settlement needing to take place in accordance with the 
expectations of the Chinese people. ‘In language which strongly reflects that of Mao in his 
pursuit of national unity towards socialist progress, Chou’s final letter to Nehru prior to the 
failed negotiations in 1960 notes the support that settlement could offer (Amerkar & 
Diverkar, 1964): 
 
Both of our countries are still very backward, economically and culturally. We urgently 
need to engross ourselves in long-term peaceful construction at home so as to free 
ourselves step by step from the present state of backwardness (p. 164). 
 
Certainly as suggested by other authors, the Sino-Indian border issues in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s were tied explicitly to the matter of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Yet the 
important difference here is that these need to be understood with reference to the ontological 
security of the concept of a unified China, not due to the strategic importance of Tibet or the 
need for border security. It is for this reason that this offer of settlement occurred in 
conjunction with other offers of settlement, beginning late in 1959, at a time during which the 
unified China ontology was central to Chinese goals of socialist progression. Settlement of 
the border for material security could have occurred at any time during the first decade of the 
PRC. Equally, the offer to settle could have been undertaken during the months that followed 
the Tibetan revolt in Lhasa. Instead, the Chinese decision to settle with India and to concede 
disputed territory coincided with the Dalai Lama’s most high profile challenge to the identity 
of a unified China. Thus, where this ontology was threatened externally, Chinese behaviour 
shifted to secure it. This was sought through the recognition of the authority of the PRC to 
determine Tibet’s external border, as settlement with India would thus have acted to validate 
China’s incorporation of Tibet into China by reaffirming the PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet in 
the most formal and internationally legitimate sense.  
 
China maintained its policy of settlement and concession along the McMahon Line 
throughout 1961, during the period in which Nehru undertook his ‘Forward Policy’ and 
progressively moved Indian forces towards and over the disputed boundary. What ultimately 
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caused China’s determination was Chinese perception that India’s claim to the strategically 
important Aksai Chin was occurring in conjunction with Indian collusion with the United 
States Central Intelligence Agency ‘to weaken and undermine China’s rule in Tibet’ (Garver 
J. W., 2004, p. 10). Thus, it was only once the integrity of the Tibetan people as Chinese 
subjects was perceived as being under direct threat from India, and not the threat to the 
border itself, that China determined to use force against India in October 1962. This theory is 
supported by the subsequent withdrawal of Chinese forces away from the border at the height 
of China’s success in the war, from which they moved back towards calling for negotiation.  
 
Following the war and the breakdown of diplomatic relations between India and China, with 
India’s policy of no concessions unchanging, the possibility of attaining ontological security 
in Tibet through settlement of the border was no longer achievable for China. Nevertheless, 
this same goal was subsequently pursued by the Chinese via alternative means. In 1965 the 
Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) was officially established. The interaction of the border 
dispute with Tibet’s incorporation into the socialist Chinese state, and the centrality of this to 
progress in the state, are illustrated at this time in an article in the People’s Daily. In this 
article, the rhetoric regarding the border war was being used to affirm the unification of the 
Tibetan people who had ‘joined the Han people and the peoples of other nationalities to wage 
an unflinching fight [against the Indians]’. In turn, this had led Tibet to ‘safeguard the 
unification of the motherland’, while in Tibet the ‘economy, with its socialist and semi-
socialist character is gaining progress’ (Hinton, 1980, pp. 834-835). The establishment of the 
TAR occurred as an opportunity to further repeat  the denunciation of the Dalai Lama,  and 
signalled the CCP’s ‘desire to secularize the Tibetan administration’ along with the full 
incorporation of Tibet into the state’s provincial system (Dreyer, 1976, p. 201). The 
leadership of the Tibetan government, which had previously been filled by the Dalai Lama, 
was replaced by a secular leader. This, in turn, was followed by the more extreme 
assimilation policies of the Cultural Revolution, during which time the Sino-Indian border 
remained unaddressed. 
D  The 1970s: The Central Kingdom in the South China Sea 
According to Chen, in the late 1960s and following into the early 1970s, sino-centrism and 
great power entitlement played a central role in Chinese relations with its South-East Asian 
neighbours. Chen (2001) argues that the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations during 
the Vietnam War occurred as North Vietnam refused to recognise the superiority of China 
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amongst Asian nations. Thus Beijing’s decision to withdraw support from the North 
Vietnamese is seen as a consequence of the North Vietnamese decision to negotiate with the 
United States despite advice from the Chinese communists to the contrary, and the offence 
this caused to Chinese perceptions of itself and its rightful place in Asia. This pattern extends 
beyond Sino-North Vietnamese relations, with Chen noting that (2001): 
 
From a historical-cultural perspective, Beijing’s seemingly revolutionary and idealistic 
policy towards Vietnam ironically had been penetrated by an age-old Chinese 
ethnocentrism and universalism. While Beijing’s leaders and Mao in particular, 
emphasised repeatedly that the Vietnamese should be treated as “equals,” the statement 
itself revealed the Chinese revolutionaries’ strong sense of superiority… Beijing asked 
for something bigger, that is, the Vietnamese recognition of China’s morally superior 
position. In other words, what Beijing intended to create was a modern version of the 
relationship between the Central Kingdom and its subordinate neighbours [emphasis 
added]. (The Failure of an “Alliance between Brotherly Comrades”, para. 5) 
 
Thus the actions of South East Asian states such as North Vietnam caused insecurity to the 
‘Central State’ ontology, within which peripheral states were expected to show deference to 
Chinese moral and material authority. This sense of superiority was magnified in the early 
1970s by China’s inclusion in the United Nations, and China’s rapprochement with the 
United States. It is within this context of Chinese superiority over its neighbours, particularly 
those of South East Asia, that Chinese aggression and the use of force in the 1974 Battle of 
the Paracels can be understood. That is, this change in Chinese behaviour can be viewed as an 
attempt to secure this ontology through its forced recognition by peripheral states, returning 
South China Sea interactions back to those in which Chinese authority was implicit.  
 
Indeed, China’s actions during the conflict suggest an expectation that South Vietnamese 
forces would submit to China without conflict, reflecting the innate subordinate nature China 
understood its South-East Asian neighbours to hold in relation to the ‘Central Kingdom’. 
China’s initial expansion into the Paracel Island chain was undertaken by Chinese fishing 
vessels, without People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLA(N)) vessels operating in the area. 
The Chinese strategy relied on a belief that they could ‘persuade Vietnam’ to accept the 
Chinese presence in the island group. Subsequently, Chinese forces were instructed to engage 
in a ‘struggle of persuasion’ through which Vietnam would come to accept the Chinese claim 
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(Fravel, 2008, pp. 281-282). It was not until South Vietnamese forces engaged the Chinese 
that the Chinese reciprocated with force, and then captured additional islands following the 
defeat of the Vietnamese forces. That China’s expectation was that its expansion in the Island 
Group would be accepted through persuasion, and that the failure of this resulted in force, is 
reflective of the Chinese ontology of China as the Zhongguo in relation to nations on its 
periphery. This is further reflected in a Chinese statement on the conflict, in which the 
Chinese action is seen to ‘contain…the hegemonism…of South Vietnam and our country’s 
peripheral nations’ (Fravel, 2008, p. 286). 
E The 1980s and 1990s: The Reform Age and the turn in Chinese Exceptionalism 
In 1978, following the death of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution, the revolutionary 
period of the PRC gave way to domestic and international rationalisation under the leadership 
of Deng Xiaoping. As discussed in the sections below, this resulted in a new articulation of 
Chinese nationalism and movement for national unity, as well as changes in the nature of 
China’s foreign policy. Again, these changes correspond with identified transformations in 
Chinese national identity. This period sees a continuation of Chinese exceptionalism, but one 
which is prefaced in the assumption of China’s Great-Power status, not the pursuit of such a 
status. Working from this point, Chinese exceptionalism becomes typified by references to 
China’s unique culture, one founded in Imperial China, which sees China diverge from 
typical behaviours of other great powers. Thus Chinese ideology begins to stress that ‘it will 
always adopt a peaceful foreign policy, will never threaten anyone, and will help to maintain 
peace through its own development’ (Zhang, 2011, p. 311). Furthermore, the emerging 
principle of ‘harmony with difference’ ‘can be represented as the principle that countries 
should conduct harmonious relations with each other while maintaining differences in views’ 
(Zhang, 2011, p. 313). 
 
Beginning in the 1980s, changes in Chinese rhetoric regarding territorial disputes is reflective 
of this change. This rhetoric was first relaxed, and from 1988 China entered a period marked 
by an increased willingness to address territorial issues through international agreements and 
confidence building measures (Carlson, 2010). However this change in approach moved only 
to rearticulate the status quo in these disputes, rather than a move towards settlement 
realisation. Concepts of national unity and the tianxia remained pertinent to these disputes, 
although these concepts now became incorporated into Chinese identity in a way which saw 
them also affirm China’s unique, superior and peaceful nature. Thus the uniquely peaceful 
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nature of the Chinese state is achieved through an ‘assimilation and integration of different 
peoples and cultures’ unachievable by the west (Zhang, 2011, pp. 311-313).  External peace 
is seen as achievable through the incorporation of South East Asia into the tianxia, with the 
‘Central State’ now offering the model of peaceful and cooperative behaviour (Zhang, 2011, 
pp. 311-313). Below, these changes to Chinese national identity are applied to the occasional 
tension, and the emergence of cooperative behaviour in the Sino-Indian border dispute and 
the South China Sea disputes during the 1980s and 1990s. 
1 The Sino-Indian Dispute and Defining the Chinese Nation 
Sino-Indian cooperation regarding territory disputes leading to the recognition of, and 
agreement to accept, the line of actual control came on the back of two significant events; the 
uprisings and unrest in Tibet at the end of the 1980s, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
demonstrations. During the early 1980s, Chinese policy in Tibet had liberalised and allowed 
for greater autonomy within the Tibetan region, as well as the recognition and practice of 
Tibetan culture and Buddhist religion (Mackerras, 1994, p. 154).  Increased integration of 
Tibet into the Chinese state had therefore moved away from the strict assimilation policies of 
the past decades, and was now pursued through increased economic integration of the region 
with central China (Smith Jr., 2009, p. 166). During this time it was generally felt that 
improved conditions were successfully facilitating integration of Tibet into China, a 
perception which provided a state of relative security of the situation of Tibet within the 
unified China ontology. Thus, while border talks were occurring between China and India in 
the context of improving Sino-Indian relations, it will be recalled that no meaningful progress 
was made on the issue, with no formal agreements sought by either side. 
 
That the liberalisation policy in Tibet resulted in an increase in Tibetan nationalism, resulting 
in increased demonstrations from separatists, evidently took Chinese elites by surprise, thus 
disrupting the narrative that Tibet was increasingly integrating into the Chinese nation. 
Beginning in September 1987, Tibetan nationalists began a series of marches through Lhasa 
calling for the separation of Tibet from China. Despite Chinese dispatches of PLA personnel 
to the region to undermine the demonstrations, they would continue until March 1989 
(Mackerras, 1994, p. 161). Calls for Tibetan independence were amplified through the 
activities of the Dalai Lama and his ‘government in exile’ during this time. These actions 
were themselves amplified further through the condemnation of China and its actions in Tibet 
by Western countries, principally the United States. When the pro-democracy demonstrations 
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in Tiananmen Square broke out in mid-1989, the ensuing crackdown by the Chinese 
government was internationally connected to the events in Tibet under the more general guise 
of human rights abuses by China (Mackerras, 1994, pp. 187-190). All this resulted in what 
was seen by the Chinese as the single most significant threat of split in the unified Chinese 
nation, and resulted first in the imposition of martial law throughout China. In effect, the 
ontological security achieved through the policies of the 1980s had been threatened both 
internally and externally. To re-secure this ontology, this threat was followed by a radical 
change in domestic policy away from the liberalisation of the 1980s, and towards a greater 
emphasis on nation unity and loyalty to the CCP (Smith Jr., 2009, p. 167). Externally, as in 
the 1960s, the integrity of Tibet within the Chinese nation was sought through the recognition 
of the limits of Chinese sovereignty as including the Tibetan region. 
 
Following the demonstrations in 1989, in order to quell the domestic unrest which had led to 
the demonstrations the central government initiated work towards what would become the 
Patriotic Education Campaign, which sought to engender ‘unified’ and ‘correct’ thinking 
among the Chinese people. This education took the form of the official domestic promotion 
of the Century of Humiliation through education, official publications and textbooks. While 
the Century of Humiliation had frequently been used to understand China’s situation within 
the international community, the mobilisation of the Chinese people had been expressed in 
terms of ‘class struggle and revolutionary victory’ (Callahan, 2009, p. 35). Now for the first 
time since before the 1930s, national humiliation became communicated as the very basis of 
the identity of the Chinese people, with the stated aims of patriotic education included to 
‘enhance national cohesion, foster national pride, [and] develop a patriotic and united front 
[emphasis added]’ (Callahan, 2009, p. 35). Thus the biographical narrative of national 
humiliation was employed in the shifting of attention away from domestic political issues, 
instead focusing ideological perspectives back to the wrong doing of foreign powers. This re-
education of the Chinese people stressed to great lengths the distinction between the foreign 
and the domestic, and the growth of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s would go on to 
reinforce the distinction between those who were internal and loyal to China and the threats 
that existed externally. This continues to be communicated in rhetoric which stresses the 
defence of national borders which ‘peacefully hold together millions and millions of families’ 
(Callahan, 2009, p. 62). In other words, the borders within which the Chinese people exist in 
unison. From the mid-1990s, patriotic education would be employed in Tibet in particular, in 
55 
 
 
 
order to transform the rise of Tibetan nationalism into a shared Chinese identity (Smith Jr., 
2009, p. 170). 
 
It is in this capacity that the 1993 agreement on the line of actual control can be seen as 
reinforcing the unified Chinese nation. During the 1990s, as part of the patriotic education 
regarding national humiliation, the Chinese government published a new wave of ‘national 
humiliation’ maps of the Chinese empire intended for domestic consumption, the first time 
such maps had been produced since the PRC’s establishment. These maps are not unique 
publications, but rather officially sanctioned and popular representations of the Chinese state. 
In his detailed analysis of these maps, Callahan notes that in the context of China’s 1990’s 
nationalism, these maps are intriguing in that they act not as ‘evidence of a loss of national 
territories… [but rather] how China has asserted national sovereignty over an ambiguous 
imperial domain, transforming the periphery into an integrated sovereign territory’ (Callahan, 
2009, p. 109). In other words, in the 1990s a clear understanding of the borders of China 
became integral to the concept of the unified Chinese nation, because they acted to show how 
the PRC had successfully incorporated areas of nominal sovereignty, including Tibet, into a 
unified and modern nation state. The agreement with India provided external recognition and 
security for this internal Chinese narrative. 
  
Therefore, as with Chinese offers of settlement in 1960, what is important here is that the 
agreements with India in the 1990s allowed China to articulate the limits of its sovereignty, 
the line of actual control, within which the Chinese nation could be seen to exist. This further 
explains why agreements were not reached during the 1980s, as it was from 1989 that the 
pursuits of this identity became most pronounced. Thus, as with the events in 1960, the 1993 
agreement took place at a time when this unity was under threat, and when the importance of 
national unity was perceived as central to the goals of the PRC. Whether settlement of the 
border took place or not was therefore not important, and in any case was still impeded by 
Indian resolve to not accept the Chinese package deal. Regardless, the Chinese authority to 
settle the border in due course was recognised by India in the agreement which stated that 
‘the two sides are of the view that the India-China boundary question shall be resolved 
through peaceful and friendly consultations’, and that in accordance with the line of actual 
control, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs would be observed (Agreement on 
the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, 1993). This was also served through India’s 
repeated recognition on Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. 
56 
 
 
 
2 Cooperation without Settlement in the South China Sea 
Chinese activities relating to its maritime territory claims in the South China Sea during this 
period resulted in conflict in 1988 and tension in 1994. This was followed by an extended 
period of cooperative behaviour during which China sought to normalise interstate relations 
within the region, without undermining its actual claims within the South China Sea. As 
noted above, the period up until 1988 represented a period of transition in Chinese territorial 
behaviour prior to cooperation occurring. This transition in the approach to territorial disputes 
is reflected in the 1988 conflict with Vietnam over Johnson Reef in the Spratly Island group. 
While the leaders in the central Chinese government progressed towards cooperative 
behaviour, in the PLA(N), naval doctrine throughout the 1980s continued to stress the ‘lost 
territories’ narrative (Buszynski, 2003, p. 346), typical of China’s previous use of force in the 
area. Such a representation of the dispute was evidently pervasive in the PLA(N)’s 
justification for its activities in the area, such as the assertion from PLA(N) personnel that 
‘every time we… sail and patrol, we exercise sovereignty on behalf of the ancestral land 
[emphasis added]’ (Garver J. W., 1992, p. 1009).  
 
The PLA(N)’s doctrine was developed under the leadership of Admiral Liu Huaqing, whose 
leadership, not that of the central Government, would drive expansion of Chinese South 
China Sea holdings into the Spratly Island group (Fravel, 2008, p. 290). Therefore, despite 
the changes in Chinese national identity noted above, the 1988 Battle of Johnston Reef must 
be understood in the same context as that of the Battle of the Paracels; that being the lack of 
deference to the ‘Central Kingdom’ in conformity with its superiority over the peripheral 
South East Asian states. Indeed, while South East Asian states had been active in the region 
throughout the 1980s, and the 1988 clash only occurred following threats to the security of 
this ontology resulting from dismissive responses from the Vietnamese to Chinese calls for 
their activities to cease, seen as an apparent affront to Chinese authority in the region. Garver 
(2011, p. 1023), while arguing that this activity was pursued for economic reasons, seems to 
suggest that the modernisation of the navy and its actions in the Paracels was enabled in large 
part due to the appeal to this aspect of Chinese identity. The centrality of the ‘lost territories’ 
narrative to the PLA(N), and its divergence from alternative Chinese identity at the time, can 
further be used to explain the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in 1994, as this action 
likely occurred without the knowledge or approval of the central Chinese government 
(Fravel, 2008, p. 297).  
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However the mid-1990s saw the influence of the PLA(N) wane (Buszynski, 2003). The years 
following the Mischief Reef occupation are notable for the initiation of Chinese behaviour 
which, in the negotiation and signing of the Declaration of Conduct with its emphasis on 
peaceful management of the dispute, is indicative of the influence of the emerging Chinese 
exceptionalism. As with the re-emergence of maps of National Humiliation relevant to 
China’s national unity, as discussed above, these maps from the mid-1990s, depicted the 
‘hierarchical depiction of vassal states, semi-states, and frontier zones’ of China, including its 
traditional sphere of influence over South East Asian states (Callahan, 2009, pp. 107-109). 
Rather than literal representations of lost territory, these instead are an articulation of the 
symbolic place of China in Asia. These maps can be understood in relation to the evolving 
ontology of Chinese exceptionalism, which saw China as a peaceful and harmonious state 
founded on unique cultural attributes inherent in the neo-tianxia. In this sense, China’s 
cooperative behaviour in the South China Sea occurs at a time when ontological security, 
particularly in relation to South East Asian states, could be achieved through the 
manifestation of China as a power with inherent influence and leadership by way of peaceful 
cooperation and development.  
  
This can be observed in the Chinese inclusions in the draft Declaration, which stressed the 
putting aside of disputes in favour of joint development and cooperation (Buszynski, 2003, p. 
355). The relevant provision in the final text reiterates this, stating that negotiations were to 
continue ‘for the purpose of promoting good neighbourliness and transparency, establishing 
harmony, mutual understanding and cooperation’ (Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea, 2002). The shift in behaviour to reflect this new Chinese national 
identity is further reflected in appeals to China’s harmonious and peaceful leadership in the 
South China Sea made by Chinese Premier, Jiang Zemin in 2002, around the time of the 
signing of the Declaration of Conduct in which he stated that (Jiang, 2012): 
 
The Chinese nation has inherited from ancient times a fine tradition of honesty, harmony 
and good faith - values that China consistently abides by in the conduct of relations with 
other countries. The very purpose of China's foreign policy is to safeguard world peace 
and promote common development.    
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In this discussion one aspect of Chinese behaviour appears to stand as an anomaly. It was 
noted that the PLA(N) was responsible for the aggressive behaviour of China in the region in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, based on a national identification separate to that emerging in 
China more generally. But why then did the central Chinese government pass the law of 
1992, challenging disputant states by designating the South China Sea as existing under the 
exclusive sovereignty of China? Buszynski (2003, p. 349) suggests that the turn in 1995 is 
representative of the shift of management of the dispute to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and the realisation that economic exploitation could better be served through multilateral 
cooperation. However an alternative explanation exists which is complementary of Chinese 
ontological security seeking as a morally superior and harmonious great-power. The 
significance of the Chinese exceptionalism of the 1990s emphasised uniquely harmonious 
behaviour. For China this uniqueness was found in the accommodation of states within the 
South China Sea despite the recognition of the region as being Chinese sovereign territory. 
Such sentiment has been noted by Carlson, much of which has risen from a ‘frustration over 
the lack of international recognition of what is seen as Chinese restraint’ (2010, p. 697). The 
formal articulation by China of the region existing as sovereign territory should therefore not 
be seen as aggressively challenging the claims of others, but in signifying the significance of 
Chinese restraint and accommodation in the South China Sea which followed. In this way the 
1992 law becomes part of the biographical narrative of the South China Seas dispute, in 
which the extent of China’s benevolence becomes understood through its situation relative to 
the formal identification of the territory as Chinese.  
F Continuing and Predicted Trends in Chinese Territory Disputes 
Since the periods of cooperation in the Sino-Indian and South China Sea disputes noted 
above, few events of equal significance have occurred. The question could be asked - what, if 
anything, can be said of the likely direction of these disputes? On China’s Indian border, the 
settlement process remains stymied by Indian nationalism, which has consistently prevented 
offers of concessions in the eastern sector from the Chinese. Given the recognition of the line 
of actual control, and the unlikelihood of agreed formal settlement, interactions with India 
over the border now offers China limited ontological security beyond the status quo. 
Nevertheless what can be suggested with confidence is that China will not attempt to extend 
its borders through force, as predicted by some realist commentators. If it is taken that mutual 
recognition and reaffirmations of Chinese unity motivate settlement, then the forced 
extension of these boundaries offers little benefit to China. Where tension or even conflict 
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occurs this is likely to be in defence of the status quo. Such actions and sentiment can be seen 
in the comments of the Chinese ambassador to India following tensions along the border in 
2009 (Keep peace on China-India border, 2009), and in the ‘resolution’ of recent tensions in 
2014 (Bedi, 2014). In lieu of changes to Indian policy, ostensible progress will continue to be 
represented in adherence to and recognition of the line of actual control, not an official 
border.  
 
Alternatively, in China’s disputes in the South China Sea, the return to aggressive behaviour 
which has occurred in recent years has followed a shift in Chinese national identity identified 
by Rozman (2011) as beginning in 2007. Rozman suggests that China’s identity as a peaceful 
and harmonious Asian leader was threatened by the renewed emphasis on the Asia-Pacific 
region by the United States under the Obama administration. Regarding China’s interactions 
with its South East Asian neighbours, this has resulted in ‘repeated references to 
neighbouring countries failing to cooperate or showing a lack of respect’ (Rozman, 2011, p. 
85). Such analysis is reflective of China’s earlier interactions within this dispute, in which 
ontological threats to China’s position as the Zhongguo were responded to through aggressive 
assertion of Chinese authority. The shift and its situation within the ontological security 
argument is supported by China’s recent aggressive behaviour towards disputant states. Thus, 
whether China’s management of its South China Sea occurs in the guise of peaceful 
cooperation or aggressive posturing and conflict, is dependent on the changing self-
perception of China’s role as a harmonious regional power. Regardless, China is unlikely to 
offer concessions to disputant nations, and therefore these are unlikely to be settled 
peacefully. Unlike China’s frontier disputes, the settlement of maritime disputes through 
Chinese concession offers little benefit to China, both materially and ideologically.   
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VI Conclusions 
Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, the construction of national 
borders for China has existed in a balance between concepts of ‘unbounded imperial domain, 
and bounded sovereign territory’ (Callahan, 2009, p. 94). In other words, the Chinese notion 
of national territory encompasses more than just its fixed boundaries but also the recognition 
of those within these boundaries as comprising a unified multi-national state, and those on the 
periphery recognising the superiority of the ‘Central Kingdom’. Two concepts cited in 
Chapter II of this thesis are worth restating now. The first, from Wendt (1992, p. 70), 
recognised that national territories exist only in context of mutual recognition of those 
territories.  The second, from Wilson and Donnan (1998, p. 9), is that this recognition serves 
to signify the ‘the eminent domain of that state’. For China, added to this can be the nature of 
the identity for which recognition is being pursued; as multi-faceted, intricately linked to 
conceptions of China’s past and contemporary greatness, morality, ascendency from 
humiliation, and national unification.  
 
It should not, therefore, surprise us that China can be seen to use its territorial disputes to gain 
recognition of its perceived self from its neighbours. States’ borders, and by extension their 
understanding of themselves relative to those borders, are ‘constituted by the ongoing 
enactment of a broad set of social interactions between states’ (Carlson, 2010, p. 680). When 
China’s conceptions of itself have come under threat, this thesis has shown that efforts to 
realign identity and behaviour have occurred through the recognition of these identities at 
China’s territorial limits. Where borders have acted as the limit of China’s sovereignty of a 
nationally pluralistic State, interactions at these borders have sought to reemphasise this 
sovereignty. It is for this reason that China did little to pursue settlement in the early years of 
the PRC, while Chinese ontological security was focussed on the international community. 
Nevertheless following transformations to China’s identity, the ensuing pursuit of ontological 
security was manifest in China’s cooperative behaviour at its borders. This can be seen in the 
early 1960s, in which the pursuit of a China united in class struggle saw China settle (or 
attempt to settle) with Indian, Burma, and various other nations. In the early 1990s, Chinese 
cooperation in the Sino-India dispute occurred at a time when China was seeking loyalty to 
the State through the association of Chinese identity and nationalism with all those within the 
State’s territorial limits. Equally, Chinese perceptions of a more direct external threat to this 
ontology have resulted in conflict in order to remove such a threat and re-establish routine in 
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China’s interactions with the disputant state, as occurred with India in 1962. Alternatively, 
where territory disputes have extended beyond the realms of China’s population and into the 
areas contested by states traditionally seen as subordinate quasi-vassals of China, China’s 
behaviour has acted to reinforce perceptions of itself as a superior state. This can occur 
through both the aggressive coercion of smaller states, as occurred when ontological threats 
arose from interactions with disputant states which were dismissive of China’s identity as the 
central and superior Asian state. Equally, cooperation in these disputes, as at the turn of the 
century, occurred when China’s Self took on the historical role of a superior central state 
which is uniquely harmonious and peaceful.  
 
Further research is required to ascertain the validity of this thesis to further Chinese territory 
disputes. Nonetheless, a brief reading of further disputes suggests that the validity of this 
approach is not confined to the case studies discussed above. For example, the Nepalese 
settlement of the Tibetan boundary in the early 1960s reflects the issues arising from the 
Indian dispute. In this case, China had chosen not to negotiate from the mid-1950s, only to 
change its course and welcome settlement through concession, with negotiations beginning in 
March 1960 (Hyer, 1990, p. 189), shortly after the ontological threat regarding Tibet had 
occurred. Equally, negotiations with the Soviet Union were first pursued by China in 1960, 
coinciding with efforts to secure Chinese national unity elsewhere. Chinese efforts to settle 
this dispute through concession redoubled following ethnic Kazakh migration and Soviet 
propaganda in Xinjiang in the northwest of the border, while in the northeast China’s 
concession was offered subject to the inclusion of 64 Chinese villages within the Chinese 
border (Fravel, 2008, p. 101; Hyer, 1990, p. 283). Both these points suggest that the inclusion 
of border peoples within the Chinese nation was central to the Chinese position in this 
dispute.  Alternatively, strengthening differences in ontological security in maritime disputes, 
the central importance of the Century of Humiliation to the ongoing Sino-Japanese dispute 
over the Senkaku islands, principally related to China’s victimisation under Imperial Japan, is 
well acknowledged in existing literature (Wiegand, 2009).  
 
Finally, this thesis has contributed to International Relations scholarship in several ways. 
Broadly speaking, it has extended the validity of the ontological security approach to territory 
disputes, an approach of relatively limited application to date. In doing so, this thesis has 
added to the growing body of International Relations literature in which the material security 
of a State is not seen as its primary motivation. It is in the same sense that this thesis has 
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added to literature on China and its territory disputes. The prevalence of realist approaches to 
China’s behaviour in its disputes has faced little opposition from alternative theoretical 
approaches, in the absence of liberal explanatory theories for this behaviour, and 
constructivist approaches which have generally focussed on interaction with a single external 
state. However, what this thesis has shown is that an analysis of Chinese national identity is 
integral to the proper understanding of Chinese behaviour across its many disputes. 
Furthermore, such analysis need not be limited to apparent irredentist pursuits of lost 
territory. Given common rhetoric which sees these disputes as primary points of international 
tension, it is an appreciation which both International Relations scholarship and international 
policy makers stand to benefit from. 
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